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This Article tackles the mismatch between the blackletter doctrine and the
shape of the case law, and it aims to elucidate, in straightforward terms,
what the right of publicity actually is.
This Article explains how, in the absence of a clear enunciation of its
scope, courts have come to define the right of publicity negatively, through
the application of independent defenses based on free speech guarantees
and copyright preemption. This inverted doctrinal structure has created a
continuing crisis in the right of publicity, leading to unpredictable
outcomes and the obstruction of clear thinking about policy concerns.
The trick to making sense of the right of publicity, it turns out, is to
understand that the right of publicity is not really one unitary cause of
action. Instead, as this Article shows, the right of publicity is best
understood as three discrete rights: an endorsement right, a merchandizing
entitlement, and a right against virtual impressment. This restructuring
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INTRODUCTION
Since the right of publicity first sprang up some sixty years ago,1 a
steady stream of scholars has singled it out for disdain: It is theoretically
unsound.2 It is socially pernicious.3 It is wildly unpredictable in practice.4
1

Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from
Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1162–63 (2006) (noting the “absence of any clear theoretical
foundation” for the right of publicity and concluding that “no one seems to be able to explain exactly
why individuals should have this right”); William K. Ford & Raizel Liebler, Games Are Not Coffee
Mugs: Games and the Right of Publicity, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 16, 18
(2012) (noting the lack of wide acceptance of the economic-incentives argument for the right of
publicity and noting the existence of “many benefits, including monetary benefits, to celebrity status
separate from the revenue tied to the right of publicity,” and further noting “[t]he Lockean explanation
2
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But in all the criticism that has been heaped on the right of publicity, what
has been ignored is the congenital problem at the center of the doctrine:
courts have yet to clearly articulate what the right of publicity is. Strangely,
this fault has been glossed over for decades.
According to blackletter law, the right of publicity provides persons
with a cause of action against anyone who makes a commercial use of their
name, image, likeness, or other indicia of identity. This account, with slight
variations in language, is recited by countless courts,5 but a moment’s
reflection demonstrates that it is not true.
Imagine what would happen if people really could recover just
because their names are being exploited commercially. Every credit
reporting agency would shutter instantly. Every celebrity gossip magazine
would be drowned in liability. And every company that sells customer lists
may provide a starting point, but it does not clearly explain when there are countervailing policy
considerations”); Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity
Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 127, 177–78 (1993) (arguing that the right of publicity expanded in scope and
jurisdictional recognition despite an absence of compelling rationales); Mark P. McKenna, The Right of
Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 225, 226–27 (2005) (regarding an
alleged grounding in economic theory, observing that “courts by and large have refused to draw the one
distinction a theory based on economic value is capable of drawing—between claimants whose
identities have value and those whose identities do not”).
3
See, e.g., Madow, supra note 2, at 239 (“There is no doubt that the right of publicity makes
private censorship of popular meaning-making possible. It creates an opportunity for celebrities (or
their assiguees [sic]) to suppress disfavored meanings and messages.”).
4
See, e.g., JULEE L. MILHAM, THE PRACTICE OF MUSIC LAW IN FLORIDA ch. XIV (2006)
(observing that a “stew of standards can make right of publicity actions particularly unpredictable”);
Joel Anderson, What’s Wrong with This Picture? Dead or Alive: Protecting Actors in the Age of Virtual
Reanimation, 25 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 155, 168 (2005) (noting “the crazy-quilt variety of judicial
decisions that show the unpredictable nature of the law” in the context of actors); Ann Margaret Eames,
Caught on Tape: Exposing the Unsettled and Unpredictable State of the Right of Publicity, 3 J. HIGH
TECH. L. 41, 41 (2004) (noting that “[t]he parameters of these permissible or defendable uses are at
times unclear” and “[t]he lack of defined parameters potentially allows a party to benefit from the
unauthorized use of another’s identity while the subject in use remains exploited and uncompensated”).
5
See, e.g., Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (“A common
law cause of action for appropriation of name or likeness may be pleaded by alleging (1) the
defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness to
defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury.”
(citations omitted)); Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1355 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
(“Considering plaintiffs’ appropriation claim, the elements of the tort are: an appropriation, without
consent, of one’s name or likeness for another’s use or benefit. This branch of the privacy doctrine is
designed to protect a person from having his name or image used for commercial purposes without
consent.” (citations omitted)); Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 368 (Mo. 2003) (“The interest
protected by the misappropriation of name tort is the interest of the individual in the exclusive use of his
own identity, in so far as it is represented by his name or likeness, and in so far as the use may be of
benefit to him or others.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995) (explaining that the right of publicity provides a cause of
action for the appropriation of “the commercial value of a person’s identity by using without consent
the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade”).
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to direct mailers and telemarketers would have to run for the hills. The
right of publicity, by its own blackletter terms, should stop all these
commercial uses of identity. Yet it does not. One thing is certain: the right
of publicity is not what it says it is.
The right of publicity is not a nullity or a phantom. It exists, and it has
de facto coherence. Lawyers, judges, and commentators seem generally to
share an intuitive sense of its boundaries. But those boundaries lack
meaningful articulation. And the mismatch between what the right of
publicity is said to be and how it is handled by courts has caused a great
deal of confusion.
If any progress is to be made with the right of publicity—whether in
criticizing it, supporting it, repairing it, or even dismantling it—the first
order of business should be figuring out what, exactly, it is and how to
express that. To that end, this Article aims to lay bare the doctrinal
decrepitude of the right of publicity, explain what havoc it wreaks, and
propose a reformulation of the doctrine that conforms to its real-world
scope. Disentangling the doctrine should ultimately be of service to the
right of publicity’s supporters and its detractors, as well as to those who
simply want to know, as a practical matter, whether a given situation is
likely to create liability.
In endeavoring to clear up the longstanding infirmity of right-ofpublicity doctrine, this Article makes a couple of observations that should
contribute to a much better understanding of the right of publicity.
First, unlike most legal doctrines, the right of publicity is currently
defined negatively. That is, the law lacks a good positive description of
what the right of publicity is. Instead, the cases are constantly working on
the question of what the right of publicity is not. Much of the theoretical
and practical trouble with the right of publicity can be traced to this
doctrinal inversion.
The second point is related to the first: The scope of the right of
publicity is mostly defined extra-doctrinally. That is, instead of being selflimiting, the right of publicity, by its own letter, expands far beyond its
permissible scope. It is up to other doctrines from other fields—notably the
First Amendment and preemption by federal copyright law—to lop off the
right of publicity’s doctrinal excess and force it back within intuitive limits.
With the goal of uninverting the doctrinal architecture, this Article
proposes to recast the blackletter doctrine. The trick to doing this
successfully is to observe that what courts and commentators have been
calling “the right of publicity” is really multiple rights: the endorsement
right, the merchandizing entitlement, and the right against virtual
impressment.
894
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Describing the right of publicity as multiple causes of action rather
than one is not only more faithful to the state of the law in practice, it
should also allow us to begin a more fine-tuned theoretical discussion of
the right of publicity, allowing both proponents and opponents to provide
more clearly articulated arguments as to when and whether the imposition
of liability is justifiable.
This Article is organized as follows. Part I provides a historical
framing of the right of publicity. Part II describes the flawed architecture of
the right of publicity, explaining how current blackletter formulations of
the right of publicity fail to correspond to the results reached by courts. Part
III proposes reconceptualizing the right of publicity as three separate
causes of action. Part IV discusses some implications.
I.

HOW THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY GOT TO BE THE WAY IT IS NOW

Articles about the right of publicity conventionally include a brief
narrative of its history. I will do the same here, but with a critical bent.
Since this Article’s project is to disentangle the doctrine of the right of
publicity, it is necessary to confront squarely the law’s convolutions and
muddles. That being the case, I want to avoid providing a pat, overly tidy
account of the right of publicity’s origins. So, in this Part, I first set out the
traditional narrative sketch of the origins of the right of publicity. Next, I
try to give a sense of how that classic account glosses over substantial
disorder. Last, I work to untangle varying labels that have been applied to
the doctrine, including “appropriation” and “misappropriation.”
A.

The Traditional Narrative Sketch

First, in this Section A, I will lay out the classic sketch of how the
right came to be. This is more than curiosity-satisfying background
knowledge. Given the opacity of right-of-publicity doctrine itself, the
origin story provides a way of imposing some sense of order on key rightof-publicity concepts. But a warning: while not necessarily inaccurate, this
traditional origin story can be misleading. Smoothing over the chaos in the
right of publicity’s history makes it seem as if the doctrine has more order
than it really does. So, in the following Section B, I will try deliberately to
muss up, at least a little, this classic account.
The conventional thumbnail sketch of the history of the right of
publicity generally tracks the one laid out in a comment to the 1995
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.6 It runs like this: the right of

6

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b.
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publicity was born out of tort law’s right of privacy.7 The tort-based right
of privacy—what can be called the right to be left alone—traces back to a
seminal 1890 law review article by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D.
Brandeis, The Right of Privacy.8 Subsequent to Warren and Brandeis’s
article, the right of privacy was embraced by courts in increasing numbers
until it became a majority rule in the United States. The right of publicity
then obtained an independent existence around the mid-twentieth century.
This emancipation of the right of publicity is principally pinned on two
references. One is the 1953 baseball-cards case of Haelan Laboratories,
Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,9 which used the term “right of
publicity”10 and is said to be the first case that recognized the right of
publicity as such.11 The other is a highly influential 1960 law review article
by William L. Prosser, which, in analyzing seventy years of cases since
Warren and Brandeis, declared that the right of privacy was really four
separate torts: intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure, false light, and
appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness.12 Haelan, according to
7

See, e.g., Montgomery v. Montgomery, 60 S.W.3d 524, 528 (Ky. 2001) (“The common-law right
of publicity evolved from the appropriation prong of the right of privacy. But ‘it is a distinct cause of
action intended to vindicate different interests.’ As originally postulated, the right of privacy protects
one’s right ‘to be let alone.’ Whereas the right of publicity protects the right to control the commercial
value of one’s identity. The appropriation prong of the invasion of privacy originally sought to
compensate for the emotional distress accompanied by the unauthorized use of one’s likeness and
identity. But as the tort has evolved, it is clearly the commercial interests in one’s identity that the
appropriation prong of tort serves to protect the most.” (footnotes and citations omitted)); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (“The principal historical antecedent of
the right of publicity is the right of privacy.”).
8
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); see
also Ford, supra note 2, at 6 (noting that “[t]he standard account of the right of publicity begins with
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’ 1890 article”); M.C. Slough, Privacy, Freedom, and
Responsibility, 16 U. KAN. L. REV. 323, 325–27 (1968) (discussing the seminal importance of Warren
and Brandeis’s article).
9
202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
10
Although it is fair to give credit to Haelan for sewing on the label “right of publicity” to the
doctrine it is credited as creating, the Haelan court was not the first to use the phrase “right of
publicity.” That honor appears to go to an English case. See Kelly v. Morris, 1 Law Rep. Eq. 697, 702
(1866) (in a case regarding a copyright claim that would not be supported by modern law concerning
factual information in a business directory, “the defendant goes on in his affidavit to propound a most
extraordinary doctrine as to the right of publicity in the names of private residents, who had, as he
expressed it, ‘given their names for public use’”).
11
See, e.g., Madow, supra note 2, at 147 (“Despite intimations in earlier cases, the right of
publicity was recognized for the first time” in Haelan.). An article titled The Right of Publicity,
published the year after Haelan, helped give scholarly accreditation to the right of publicity. See
Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954). Echoing Haelan,
Nimmer argued that publicity causes of action were distinct from privacy causes of action, since
privacy plaintiffs felt injured by intrusion into their lives, whereas publicity plaintiffs merely felt injured
by a lack of compensation. Id.
12
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
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Prosser, belonged within the fourth category, appropriation of name or
likeness.13
Along with pointing to these mileposts in the development of the right
of publicity, customary accounts of the right of publicity identify a number
of story arcs or themes to characterize the law’s progression.
One such theme is that the right of publicity is said to have evolved
progressively from a tort cause of action to a form of intellectual property.14
Correspondingly, the right of publicity is said to have represented a
transition from concern over redressing an injury to concern over enforcing
property rights.15
Another historical evolution ascribed to the right of publicity is that in
its early days the right of publicity was reserved for celebrities—that is,
those few people who had a present pecuniary value attached to their
fame—but it has, over the decades, been increasingly recognized as a right
belonging to the everyday person.16
Finally, the traditional historical narrative emphasizes the right of
publicity’s dispersion through the courts and its increasing fixedness in
law. Indeed, the right of publicity has found a place in the law of a majority

13

Id. at 406–07.
See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 150 (3d Cir. 2013) (“The right of publicity grew
out of the right to privacy torts. . . .”); id. at 151 (“[T]he goal of maintaining a right of publicity is to
protect the property interest that an individual gains and enjoys in his identity through his labor and
effort. Additionally, as with protections for intellectual property, the right of publicity is designed to
encourage further development of this property interest.” (citation omitted)); see also Comedy III
Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 804 (Cal. 2001) (stating that “[t]he right of publicity,
like copyright, protects a form of intellectual property that society deems to have some social utility”).
Whether, in fact, the right of publicity ought to be considered a form of intellectual property is best
regarded as an open question—one I won’t weigh in on here.
15
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (1995) (“The
‘appropriation’ tort as described by Prosser and the Restatement, Second, of Torts subsumes harm to
both personal and commercial interests caused by an unauthorized exploitation of the plaintiff’s
identity. Classification of the tort as an aspect of the right of privacy, however, led some courts to deny
relief to well-known personalities whose celebrity precluded the allegations of injury to solitude or
personal feelings normally associated with an invasion of privacy. The historical connection with
personal privacy also impeded the transfer of rights in the commercial value of a person’s identity.”);
see also 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 4:3 (2d ed. 2009) (“The
ephemeral and relative nature of ‘celebrity’ and ‘fame’ makes such concepts much too slippery to use
as any firm ground for overall legal analysis.”).
16
See, e.g., Cheatham v. Paisano Publications, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 381, 386 (W.D. Ky. 1995)
(regarding a common law right-of-publicity action, stating that celebrity status should not be a
prerequisite for a right-of-publicity claim; what matters is that the plaintiff’s identity has commercial
value); KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713, 717 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (“California’s
appropriation statute is not limited to celebrity plaintiffs.”); Hetter v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of
Nev., 874 P.2d 762, 765 (Nev. 1994) (“The Nevada statute has not limited the cause of action to
celebrities . . . .”).
14
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of American jurisdictions, either by obtaining common law recognition or
through statutory enactment.17
B.

Complications

The problem with the traditional genesis story of the right of publicity
is that it may leave the reader with the impression that the law unfolded
like a seedling tree, putting out branches in an orderly way, as if
preordained, following some internal logic eventually manifested in the
doctrine. A more fine-grained look at the development of the right of
publicity, however, reveals that the doctrine’s origin story is much less tidy
than the usual account would let on.
While I will not attempt a thorough re-evaluation of the history of the
right of publicity here, I do want to draw attention to some of the
complications in the right of publicity’s development. My aim is to remove
some of the gloss of orderliness that the right of publicity has accumulated.
One portion of the history due for some mussing is the Warren and
Brandeis article.18
The Warren and Brandeis article is cited with great frequency, almost
reflexively, by courts19 and scholars20 when the topic of the right of
publicity comes up. The reference seems obligatory. After all, the Warren
and Brandeis article is credited with begetting the right of privacy. And the
right of privacy is, thanks to Prosser, understood to have eventually split
off into four branches, of which the right of publicity is one. Yet while the
article may have in fact touched off the chain of jurisprudence that led to
the right of publicity, the article’s reasoning arguably fails to support the
modern doctrine at all.
Warren and Brandeis’s motivation in writing was the burgeoning
“evils”21 of mass media. They noted that while photographers had formerly
needed a cooperative subject who sat still for a prolonged exposure, new

17

See Sean Elliott, Dancing Promotions, Dodging Preemption, and Defending Personas: Why
Preempting the Right of Publicity Deprives Talent the Publicity Protection They Deserve, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1625, 1634 & n.51 (1998) (collecting citations).
18
See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8.
19
See, e.g., Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 74 (Ga. 1905) (“[T]he authors ably and
forcefully maintained the existence of a right of privacy . . . .”); Schuyler v. Curtis, 15 N.Y.S. 787, 788
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1891) (The article is “an able summary of the extension and development of the law of
individual rights, which well deserves and will repay the perusal of every lawyer.”). As of January 17,
2017, the Westlaw database counts 400 cases citing Warren and Brandeis.
20
As of May 27, 2017, the Westlaw database counts 2,848 law review articles citing Warren and
Brandeis.
21
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 198.
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technology allowed quick, surreptitious snapshots.22 With technology
ascending, they saw morals sliding. Warren and Brandeis decried the social
ills of newspaper gossip: “Easy of comprehension, appealing to that weak
side of human nature . . . no one can be surprised that it usurps the place of
interest in brains capable of other things.”23 These twin developments—the
quickening of shutter times and the easing of editorial standards—were
what necessitated the recognition of a tort-based right of privacy. In other
words, to the extent Warren and Brandeis were able to see into the future,
what they wanted most to save us from is the cell-phone-video-and-longlens-fueled stream of gossip that permeates our society through cable
television, checkout-aisle news racks, and a vast array of websites and
social media platforms.
Insofar as Warren and Brandeis’s article is the ultimate source of the
right of publicity, it is deeply ironic. For although the right of publicity is
broad in scope and penetrating in its effects on the media, if there is one
thing it does not protect against, it is TMZ and the gossip industry. Warren
and Brandeis had hoped that lawsuits could stop the camera-abetted
publication of trivialities.24 What we have instead is a legal safe-zone for
ambush video journalism about celebrities drinking coffee.25 Meanwhile,
the law provides a solid cause of action for celebrities to use against
merchandisers selling their likeness on a coffee mug26—something that
appears entirely removed from Warren and Brandeis’s project.
If Warren and Brandeis’s article does not provide a firm foundation
for the right of publicity, one might think the recognized first right-ofpublicity case would—that is, Judge Jerome Frank’s 1953 opinion in the
Second Circuit case of Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum,
Inc.27
The case involved rival manufacturers of chewing gum, both of whom
packaged baseball cards with their gum. Plaintiff Haelan Labs had an
exclusive contract with several baseball players to waive their right of
privacy claims so that Haelan Labs could print baseball cards with their

22

Id. at 211.
Id. at 196.
24
Id. (“The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of
decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade . . . .”).
25
See TMZ’s Top Coffee Drinkers: It’s Time for the Percolator (Part Two), TMZ (Sept. 30, 2015,
12:07 PM), http://www.tmz.com/2015/09/30/celeb-coffee-drinking-video/ [https://perma.cc/8SX89CE3].
26
See, e.g., Ford & Liebler, supra note 2, at 3 (using likeness-bearing coffee mugs as a classic
right-of-publicity violation).
27
202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
23
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names and likenesses.28 Notwithstanding the purported exclusivity of those
contracts, some baseball players subsequently signed similar baseball card
contracts with Topps.29
Haelan went to the Second Circuit on a claim of inducing breach of
contract.30 But the court moved in a different doctrinal direction to resolve
the case. The court held that, independent of any right of privacy, “a man
has a right in the publicity value of his photograph.”31 The court explained
that this right was assignable: “i. e., the right to grant the exclusive
privilege of publishing his picture, and that such a grant may validly be
made ‘in gross,’ i. e., without an accompanying transfer of a business or of
anything else.”32 The court then christened the right it had identified with
the name “right of publicity” and shaped thinking about it for decades to
come by explaining that the right’s essence was not about hurt feelings—as
it was with the right of privacy—but about money.33
The literature generally recognizes this as the birth of the right of
publicity, not only for its christening, but also for marking two key related
doctrinal transitions: becoming independent of the right of privacy and
making a transition from tort to property. This clean picture of the right of
publicity’s birth, however, glosses over some wrinkles.
For one, the story of the right of publicity ascending from the tort
sphere to property sphere is weakened when one considers an often-ignored
part of Frank’s opinion. “Whether it be labelled a ‘property’ right is
immaterial,” he wrote, “for here, as often elsewhere, the tag ‘property’
simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has pecuniary
worth.”34 Given this context, it seems likely that Haelan did not mean to
propertize the doctrine in full.
Also glossed over is the issue as to whether the acknowledgment of
the right of publicity, as such, was necessary to the outcome of the case.
Haelan Labs won 3–0. But on the issue of creating the right of publicity,
the court was split 2–1. Chief Judge Thomas Walter Swan issued a terse
concurrence agreeing with the panel only insofar as perceiving a cause of

28

Id. at 867.
Id.
30
Id. at 869.
31
Id. at 868.
32
Id.
33
Id. (“This right might be called a ‘right of publicity.’ For it is common knowledge that many
prominent persons (especially actors and ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised through
public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for
authorizing advertisements . . . .”).
34
Id.
29
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action for intentional inducement of breach of contract.35 Swan’s
concurrence suggests that the majority’s statements acknowledging the
existence of a right-of-publicity cause of action should have been regarded
as dicta, on the grounds that it was not necessary to the disposition of the
case.36
What is more, instead of creating the right of publicity as an evolution
or derivation of the right of privacy, the court claimed to rely on two cases
it said had already recognized the right.37 This supposition, however, does
not stand up to scrutiny. One of the two cases was Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff
Gordon,38 a contracts case whose result is consistent with a straightforward
theory of trademark rights in a name and which implies nothing about a
right of publicity.39 The other case, Madison Square Garden Corp. v.
Universal Pictures Co.,40 is even further removed from anything
resembling a right of publicity. In that case, a sports arena sued a film
studio for inserting into a movie crowd-scene footage filmed at the arena.41
While Madison Square Garden Corp. is an analytical muddle,42 it is clear
the decision could not have rested implicitly or otherwise on the right of
publicity, for there was no issue of a commercial exploitation of the
identity of any identifiable natural person in the case—a commonality of all
right of publicity violations.43
35

Id. at 869 (Swan, C.J., concurring).
See, e.g., JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 261 (1921) (To have
“the weight of a precedent,” a proposition must be “necessary for the decision of a particular case”;
otherwise it is dictum.). It should be noted that what in an opinion ought to be regarded as dicta is
subject to considerable debate. See, e.g., Ryan S. Killian, Dicta and the Rule of Law, 2013 PEPP. L.
REV. 1, 8–15 (discussing differing ideas of what constitutes dicta).
37
Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868.
38
118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
39
Id. (“The defendant styles herself ‘a creator of fashions.’ Her favor helps a sale. Manufacturers
of dresses, millinery, and like articles are glad to pay for a certificate of her approval. The things which
she designs, fabrics, parasols, and what not, have a new value in the public mind when issued in her
name.”).
40
7 N.Y.S.2d 845 (N.Y. App. Div. 1938).
41
Id. at 847.
42
The clearest thing that can be said about the decision is that the court, seemingly unconcerned
with doctrine or precedent, emphasized its equitable power and painted the question before it as being
about “whether the acts complained of are fair or unfair.” Id. at 853. Interestingly, the case was later
relied upon by National Basketball Ass’n v. Sports Team Analysis and Tracking Systems, Inc., 931 F.
Supp. 1124, 1157 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), in issuing a permanent injunction against a business distributing
real-time sports scores and information by pager. That decision was vacated by the Second Circuit,
which held that to the extent New York law allowed a misappropriation claim for the sports data, it was
preempted by the Copyright Act. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845–54 (2d
Cir. 1997).
43
See, e.g., Bear Foot, Inc. v. Chandler, 965 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (“[T]here is no
right of publicity in a corporation . . . .”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
36
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Much more could be said about the episodic chaos in the origins of the
right of publicity. But I hope with these few examples I have done
something to dispel the patina of orderliness that comes with an idealized
version of the right of publicity’s development. My suspicion is that the
overly romanticized origin story of the right of publicity and its frequent
repetition have contributed to the fact that courts and commentators have
generally not engaged with what should be glaring doctrinal problems with
the way the right of publicity is formulated.
C.

Appropriation, the Right of Publicity, and Other Labels

As a final matter of setting the stage for talking about the present state
of the right of publicity and its doctrinal problems, it is necessary to
address the confusing issue of labels—in particular, the use of the term
“appropriation” in lieu of “right of publicity.”
Prosser, in his influential 1960 article, labeled his fourth privacy tort
“appropriation,”44 although he noted the use of the label “right of publicity”
in the Haelan case.45 Prosser’s article, as influential as it was, created a
question of whether the cause of action ought to go by the label
“appropriation” or “right of publicity.” This issue has remained unresolved.
Even worse, the persistence of two labels seems unwittingly to have
spawned the idea that the two labels might denote two separate doctrines.
Many pragmatic commentators have found that “right of publicity” and
“misappropriation” tend to be used interchangeably in the cases.46 And the
U.S. Supreme Court has lumped the terms together.47
Nonetheless, some authors have tried to distinguish appropriation (or
“misappropriation”) from the right of publicity. For example, one
commentator offered that the appropriation tort “centers on damage to
human dignity” while the right of publicity “relates to commercial damage
to the business value of human identity.”48 Consistent with this line of
§ 46 cmt. d (1995) (“The interest in personal dignity and autonomy that underlies both publicity and
privacy rights limits application of the right of publicity to natural persons. The protection available
against the unauthorized use of corporate or institutional identities is determined by the rules governing
trademarks and trade names.”).
44
Prosser, supra note 12, at 401.
45
Id. at 406–07.
46
See, e.g., KELLI L. SAGER, SUMMARY OF RIGHT OF PUBLICITY ISSUES 1 n.1 (2012),
https://law.ku.edu/sites/law.ku.edu/files/docs/media_law/Summary_of_Right_of_Publicity_Issues.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8KQW-DVGU].
47
See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 572 (1977) (using the terms
“right of publicity” and “appropriation” to describe a claim that is importantly different from a false
light claim).
48
5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28:6 (4th
ed. 2009).
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thinking, the Missouri Supreme Court called misappropriation and the right
of publicity “separate yet similar” causes of action, with misappropriation
protecting “private self-esteem and dignity” and the right of publicity
protecting against “commercial loss.”49 Then—after chiding the plaintiff for
mislabeling a right-of-publicity action as misappropriation—the Missouri
Supreme Court noted that “the elements of the two torts are essentially the
same” and unabashedly proceeded to use “misappropriation” cases as
precedent for the “right of publicity” case before it.50 If precedent can be
applied interchangeably, there seems to be little point in insisting on the
existence of two separate causes of action.
It is hard to blame courts and commentators for trying to be helpful in
making sense of the different labels. But at the end of the day,
distinguishing appropriation from the right of publicity may be as helpful
as asking a four-year-old to rake up leaves: instead of cleaning things up, it
ends up making a bigger mess.
In this Article, I treat appropriation (or misappropriation) and the right
of publicity as one. The fact is, to the extent one might perceive differences
between cases labeled as “appropriation” and those labeled “right of
publicity,” whatever fine distinctions one might find are dwarfed by bigger,
more fundamental differences in the scope of liability imposed by different
clusters of cases. And it is those more fundamental differences I am trying
to delineate in this Article.
II.

THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY’S SUBTRACTIVELY DEFINED SCOPE

The blackletter formulation of the right of publicity51 persists in a state
of illimitability, giving no meaningful guidance as to what the right of
publicity is. The courts instead give the doctrine its essential shape by
saying what the right of publicity is not. In this Part, I explain how this
negative delimiting52 of the right of publicity works, and I suggest why it is
troublesome.

49

Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 368 (Mo. 2003).
Id. at 368–69.
51
That is, that the right of publicity gives a plaintiff a cause of action against anyone making a
commercial use of the plaintiff’s name, image, voice, likeness, or other indicia of identity. See supra
note 5.
52
In talking about the “negative” aspect to the doctrinal structure of the right of publicity, let me
head off a possible point of confusion. Intellectual property scholars have used the term “negative
space” to describe “areas in which creation and innovation thrive without significant protection from
intellectual property law.” Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s Negative Space, 34 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 317 (2011). These negative spaces include “fashion, cuisine, magic tricks, stand-up comedy,
typefaces, open source software, sports, wikis, academic science and even roller derby pseudonyms.”
Id.; see also Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual
50
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In saying what the right of publicity is not, the courts largely rely on
two doctrinal vehicles: (1) freedom of expression (including the application
of the First Amendment and a “newsworthiness exception”) and (2)
copyright preemption. There are, as well, other ad hoc means of subtracting
from the scope of the right of publicity, including an “incidental use”
exception and, on occasion, the selective ignoring of law or the facts of the
case. I am going to use the word “subtrahend” to refer to all of these
doctrinal vehicles that are variously used to give right-of-publicity doctrine
its shape through subtractive or negative means.53
Let me be explicit about the claim I am making. I am not simply
pointing out that the First Amendment, copyright preemption, and other
defenses serve as external limitations on the right of publicity. That is
unremarkable. The First Amendment, for instance, serves as an external
limitation on all kinds of law.54 The difference is that other areas of law are
meaningfully demarcated doctrines in themselves—even in the absence of
the First Amendment. We can routinely say, for example, that there is
liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress in this situation, but
not in that situation, all without resort to constitutional law. The intentional
infliction of emotional distress case where the First Amendment comes into
play is the outlier.
The right of publicity is different. The right of publicity is utterly
dependent upon the First Amendment and other subtrahends to give it its
essential shape. When the First Amendment comes up in other tort or
property contexts, it is generally a case of the Constitution imposing itself
in the proceedings, blocking the common law from what it would do if left
to its own devices. The right of publicity, however, seems to be without its
own devices. In right-of-publicity cases, the First Amendment is a tool the
courts reach for in order to work the common law into some tenable form.

Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1764 (2006) (introducing the term “negative space”
in this sense). In talking about how the right of publicity’s scope is defined subtractively or negatively, I
am talking about something quite distinct from intellectual property’s negative space, as scholars have
talked about it. IP’s negative spaces are places where the scope of the law has not previously been
extended, even nominally. Thus, the discussion of IP negative spaces is not concerned with the means
by which courts demarcate the boundaries of IP doctrines, which is what I am concerned with here.
53
In mathematics, a “subtrahend” is a quantity that is subtracted from another quantity. WEBSTER’S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2281 (1993) (defining “subtrahend” as “a quantity that is to
be deducted from a minuend in the mathematical operation of subtraction”).
54
One example is intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443,
451 (2011).
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The same goes for copyright preemption and the other subtrahends. They
end up more as servants of the common law than masters of it.55
In this Part, I begin in Section A by reviewing the blackletter
formulation of the right of publicity, pointing out the implausibility of its
nominal scope. Then, in Section B, I discuss the problems inherent in
delineating legal doctrine negatively—that is, starting with an implausibly
expansive doctrine and then subtracting from its scope to reach palatable
results—rather than building doctrine positively in such a way that the
doctrine explains its own boundaries. Finally, in Section C, I look at the
right of publicity’s subtrahends in detail, providing multiple examples of
how courts have used free expression rights, copyright preemption, and
other devices to give the right of publicity meaningful shape.
A.

The Great Overbreadth of the Blackletter Law

One media law litigator summed up the state of right-of-publicity
doctrine aptly, if not flatteringly, when he wrote that the field of publicity
rights “remains a ‘Wild West’ environment.”56 For fellow litigators, he saw
upside in this, advising that they “should feel free to be creative in their
proposed theories.”57 From a more objective standpoint, however, the
doctrine is in a woeful state. Cases are all over the map in terms of
outcomes and analysis.58 There is, however, one aspect in which right-ofpublicity cases are remarkably consistent: the broad terms in which they
describe the blackletter law.
Some examples: In California, “an individual’s right to publicity is
invaded if another appropriates for his advantage the individual’s name,
image, identity or likeness.”59 In Illinois, an action requires “an
appropriation, without consent, of one’s name or likeness for another’s use
or benefit,” and “is designed to protect a person from having his name or
image used for commercial purposes without consent.”60 The 1977

55

In this paragraph, for the sake of concision, I have spoken of the common law. The same,
however, can be said of the varied state statutes providing for right-of-publicity causes of action with
broad formulations that mimic the common law.
56
Brian D. Wassom, Identity and Its Consequences: The Importance of Self-Image, Social Media,
and the Right of Publicity to IP Litigators, in LITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CASES: LEADING LAWYERS ON ANALYZING KEY DECISIONS AND EFFECTIVELY LITIGATING IP CASES
*1 (2012).
57
Id.
58
See infra Section II.D for examples.
59
Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 649 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
60
Dwyer v. Am. Exp. Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1355 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (citations omitted).
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Restatement of Torts says, “One who appropriates to his own use or benefit
the name or likeness of another is subject to liability . . . .”61
Note that these descriptions of the right of publicity embrace not only
classic situations creating liability, such as unlicensed celebrity-imagebearing lunch boxes or making a person appear to endorse a product. These
formulations also embrace what credit reporting agencies do—which is
attach financial data to person’s identities and then commercially exploit
those identities by selling credit reports to banks and other entities
interested in knowing a person’s financial history.62 That is,
unquestionably, appropriating a person’s name and other indicia of identity
for the credit agency’s own benefit.63 Yet the right of publicity does not, in
the real world, reach such situations.64
Similarly, the blackletter definition creates liability for celebrity
gossip magazines, whose business is entirely devoted to using, for purposes
of commercial gain, the names and images of celebrities. Yet it is taken for
granted that there is no right-of-publicity liability for such magazines—or
for the photographers and reporters who stock their pages.65
Common law formulations of the right of publicity are not the only
ones that are nonsensically overbroad. Many statutes are similarly
unbounded. Wisconsin’s statute, for instance, allows a cause of action for
“[t]he use, for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade, of the name,
portrait or picture of any living person, without having first obtained the
written consent of the person.”66 Rhode Island’s statute provides, simply,
“The right to be secure from an appropriation of one’s name or likeness,”
and for establishing a violation of the right, the statute requires only proof
that the appropriation was without consent and that it is “of a benefit to
someone other than the claimant.”67 Ensuring additional breadth, the statute
61

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
For background on credit reporting agencies, their business model, and their economic
incentives, see Virginia G. Maurer & Robert E. Thomas, Getting Credit Where Credit Is Due: Proposed
Changes in the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 607, 610–12 (1997).
63
Here I am translating “appropriate” as to “take (something) for one’s own use.” NEW OXFORD
AMERICAN DICTIONARY 77 (3d ed. 2010). Interestingly, the New Oxford American Dictionary’s use-ina-sentence example of appropriate, in its verb form, is a right-of-publicity usage: “[H]is images have
been appropriated by advertisers.” Id.
64
See Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1005, 1009–10 (N.H. 2003) (rejecting claim
of appropriation where a “private investigator or information broker obtains a social security number
from a credit reporting agency . . . and then sells the information”).
65
To the extent anyone tried to bring such a futile claim, a successful First Amendment defense
would be assured. Regarding the use of the First Amendment to circumscribe the scope of the right of
publicity, see infra Section II.D.1.
66
WIS. STAT. § 995.50(2)(b) (2014).
67
9 R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 § 9-1-28.1(a)(2) (2016).
62
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expressly provides that there does not need to be any publication for
liability to attach.68 Both Wisconsin’s and Rhode Island’s statutes would,
for example, encompass the activities of credit-reporting agencies and
gossip magazines.
So if the blackletter incarnation of the right of publicity does not
describe the confines of the doctrine, what does? Answering that question
is the ultimate aim of this Article, and I attempt to set out an answer in Part
III, further below. Next, however, I want to discuss what is troublesome
about defining legal doctrine by what it is not rather than by what it is.
B.

The Trouble with Subtractive Demarcation of Law

To analogize to sculpture,69 the right of publicity’s blackletter doctrine
is like a large, shapeless block of material—wood or marble, for example.
That block represents the scope of prohibited conduct—that is, conduct for
which liability will occur under the right of publicity. The subtrahends are
tools for cleaving away portions of the block, thus giving the right of
publicity its essential shape. The process is subtractive. Courts carve away
what they don’t want.
The subtractive or big-block-of-marble method is not how most legal
doctrines are constructed. Most legal doctrines, if they are like sculptures,
are made from clay. They get their essential shape from the deliberate
adding of material. It is an accretive process. Liability, like clay, is added
as needed, and the doctrine takes on the appropriate size and shape.70
A skilled sculptor can get to the same form whether she or he starts
with a block of marble and subtracts, or starts with a void and adds clay.
But the law is not indifferent to these two techniques. When doctrine is
created in a common law manner, the accretive method works well, but the
subtractive method can be disastrous.
To continue with the sculpture analogy, just as subtractive sculpting
generates a lot of waste, so too there is a price to pay with defining the right
of publicity in a subtractive manner. The most obvious problem is that it is
inefficient: we must work our way through multiple levels of analysis,
68

Id. § 9-1-28.1(a)(2)(B)(ii).
I am not the first to analogize the common law to sculpture. Unfortunately, other authors’ uses of
the metaphor seem to diverge from my broader point. See infra notes 70–71. I also acknowledge that, in
service of a metaphor to explain law, my portrayal of sculpture is necessarily simplistic and that the
artistic process of many must go far afield of my characterization.
70
That is not to say that the common law results in a static doctrine that is polished, smoothed, and
set into a museum. See Note, Business Expenses, Disallowance, and Public Policy: Some Problems of
Sanctioning with the Internal Revenue Code, 72 YALE L.J. 108, 109 (1962) (“It may be received
learning that the path of the common law resembles rather the gnarled oak than the clean lines of a
Brancusi sculpture.”).
69
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bringing in law from other areas, just to get in the neighborhood of the
correct result. In the litigation context, issues that are more complicated to
resolve are also generally more expensive to resolve.
Perhaps worse, the added analytical complexity makes right-ofpublicity problems more prone to erratic results and thus makes the case
law less scrutable for lawyers who want to provide solid advice to clients.
One case is never exactly the same as another, and law defined by
precedent has fuzzy boundaries. But when the law is built up additively, the
fuzziness is less problematic than when the law is defined negatively. This
is because we are better guided by precedent that tells us where scope of
doctrine has been found to extend in the past, rather than by precedent
centered around saying where it has been found not to exist.
Beyond the inefficiency, however, there is a larger and more
important problem with the negative way in which right-of-publicity
doctrine is structured: it leads to bad law.
With sculpture, there is generally one artist with one unitary vision of
what the sculpture should look like in the end. Thus, either accretive or
subtractive techniques can yield the same result. When working with
marble, for instance, the sculptor does not decide where to chisel based on
what chunks of the marble she or he does not like.71 Instead, the sculptor
chisels material away as a means of reaching a pre-envisioned shape.
Unlike a sculpture, however, which is authored by one artist, legal
doctrines are authored by a crowd. An unbounded number of judges each
leave a mark on the doctrine by way of trying to resolve a single case at a
time.
The fact that the common law generally works well, despite being
authored by an uncoordinated crowd, depends in large part on the fact that
most doctrines are shaped in an additive way. Judges add liability here and
there where doing so is warranted.72 Doctrine can evolve in the direction of
efficiency and justice despite a lack of coordination under any one
individual’s vision.73
71

But cf. Benjamin Means, The Vacuity of Wilkes, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 433, 448 (2011) (“In a
common law system it is not unusual for courts to consider all relevant facts and to allow the legal
principles to reveal themselves over time, as when a sculptor carves away everything that does not
belong in the finished image.”).
72
That is not to suggest, of course, that even when working in an overall accretive or additive
mode the courts won’t trim back on liability when circumstances change, or that they won’t engage in
some fine-tuning by sanding down rough spots. Cf. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON
LAW 5 (1881) (discussing how rules are modified according to backwards-constructed policy
rationales).
73
An example might be the addition of strict liability for defective products alongside existing
negligence law. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963) (introducing
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The common law, however, does not work so well in the big-block-ofmarble mode. That is the lesson of the right of publicity. Judges have been
cleaving off from the right of publicity those aspects of it with which they
are uncomfortable, rather than building up what is needed.
The object now left on the pedestal looks very different than it would
if it had been built through addition. First, the scope of liability that
remains from this subtractive mode is—as it necessarily must be—too
large. There is margin between the scope of liability we care enough to add
and the scope of liability we care enough to hack off. Thus, if the doctrine
is shaped negatively, it will retain that margin. Second, what remains is
inevitably unsound in terms of theory and policy. The scope of liability, as
it persists in whole, reflects no affirmative judgment that it ought to be
there, because subtracting only what is unwanted in a particular case is
done without thinking through whether to retain the remainder. Thus, the
doctrine ends up being misshapen—unhewed to reason, policy, or theory.
Another way to think about how the subtractive method creates bad
law is to consider that wherever the right of publicity extends, it excludes
some quantum of freedom. If we believe freedom should generally be the
default under the law—whether out of a moral conviction about liberty or
an economic ideology rooted in laissez-faire thought—then the subtractive
method of developing common law doctrine is troubling: The right of
publicity begins as a large block of prohibition, thus needlessly burdening
freedom by requiring judges to form a juridical rationale to provide for a
lack of prohibition in a particular case.
Throughout this discussion of the troubles stemming from the
subtractive demarcation of law, I have spoken of the right of publicity as a
common law doctrine. The same concepts, however, apply where the right
of publicity is based in a statute. Right-of-publicity statutes provide, by
their letter, for a sweeping scope of liability,74 leaving it up to the courts to
carve that scope down to some tenable size through ad hoc means.
C.

A Preview of the Three-Rights Approach

Next, I want to move from the abstract to the specific and discuss the
subtrahends the courts have used to carve the right of publicity. Before I
do, however, I want to take advantage of an opportunity that will allow my
discussion of the subtrahends to perform double duty.

strict products liability); see also Jill Wieber Lens, Warning: A Post-Sale Duty to Warn Targets Small
Manufacturers, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 1013, 1038 (discussing Greenman).
74
See, e.g., supra notes 66–68.
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In Part III of this Article, I suggest a way to build a positive
conceptualization of the right of publicity by conceiving of it as three
particular rights. Here I want to preview those three rights. Then, as I
explore the subtrahends, I will be able to point out how those subtrahends
tend to be used in such a way as to not tread on those three rights.
The three separate rights are (1) an endorsement right, (2) a
merchandising entitlement, and (3) a right against virtual impressment. The
endorsement right is the right to not be featured in advertising in a way that
implies an endorsement of a commercial enterprise—featuring a celebrity
wearing a brand of shoes in an ad for those shoes would infringe.75 The
merchandising entitlement provides a right to not have one’s name, image,
or identity marketed on coffee mugs, lunch boxes, or other merchandise.76
And the right against virtual impressment—which can be perceived only in
a limited number of jurisdictions—protects one’s image and identity from
being employed, marionette-like, as a virtual actor in a film or video
game.77
D.

Subtrahends of the Right of Publicity

Now I will move from the abstract to the concrete, providing
examples of how courts have used free expression guarantees, copyright
preemption, and other means to excuse the imposition of liability in cases
unilluminated by the right of publicity’s sprawling doctrine.
1.

The First Amendment, Freedom of Expression, and
Newsworthiness.—With the blackletter right-of publicity doctrine
being as broad as it is, the First Amendment is constantly called upon to do
the frontline work of deciding in run-of-the-mill cases whether an action
for right-of-publicity infringement can be maintained.78 That is, instead of
policing the law at its outer bounds or in its broadest strokes, the First
Amendment is invoked to micromanage the application of right of publicity
law and resolve routine cases.79
75

See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.B.
77
See infra Section III.C. The virtual-impressment type of right-of-publicity case is much rarer
than cases of the endorsement or merchandizing type.
78
See, e.g., Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Fitting Publicity Rights into Intellectual Property and
Free Speech Theory: Sam, You Made the Pants Too Long!, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 283, 292
(2000) (“[T]he right of publicity has been somewhat unusual because, from its earliest roots in the tort
law of privacy, writers have acknowledged that the First Amendment plays a limiting role. . . . [H]ow
large a role has been greatly and continuously underestimated.”).
79
See, e.g., Andreas N. Andrews, Stop Copying Me: Rethinking Rights of Publicity Verses the First
Amendment, 32 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 127, 130 (2013) (“Traditionally, the vast majority of
defenses against right of publicity claims focused on the First Amendment.”); see also Drew Sherman,
76
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The interaction of the First Amendment and the right of publicity is
puzzling.80 In the right-of-publicity context, the First Amendment is both
incredibly weak and incredibly strong. It is weak because the courts have
made it clear in a number of ways that the right of publicity can proceed
largely unhassled by the First Amendment because of the right of
publicity’s economic-incentive rationale and its status as a property right.81
On the other hand, one does not need to read many cases to see that the
right of publicity is dogged by the First Amendment at every turn.
Let me try to sharpen this point. I am not talking about cases brought
with the purpose of challenging the constitutionality of right-of-publicity
statutes. Of course such cases would require the involvement of the First
Amendment, just as cases challenging the constitutionality of gun laws will
require involvement of the Second Amendment. But suppose that most
criminal trials involving a weapons charge required Second Amendment
analysis to resolve. That would be analogous to the current state of right-ofpublicity litigation.
Exactly how much the First Amendment limits the right of publicity,
and what tests should be used when deciding the matter, have long been
vexing for courts and scholars.82 One might wonder, how can courts apply
the First Amendment so routinely in right-of-publicity cases without wellarticulated tests or standards for doing so? The answer to this question is
that it points up a false dilemma. Using the First Amendment to resolve a
right-of-publicity case is not constitutional jurisprudence—not really. It is
better thought of as ordinary, non-constitutional private-law jurisprudence,
done under a First Amendment label. In other words, we should not be
vexed by the lack of articulation of First Amendment law in the right-ofpublicity context. We should be troubled instead by the lack of articulation

The Right of Publicity and the First Amendment Defense in California, 9 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 29, 29
(2004) (“Freedom of speech under the First Amendment is a common defense to the right of publicity
action.”).
80
Addressing intellectual property scholars at a symposium, Mary-Rose Papandrea said, “I am a
First Amendment scholar, and the right of publicity often seems in conflict with everything I know
about the freedom of expression. Except for those cases involving fraudulent commercial endorsement,
the right of publicity seems largely unsupportable [under First Amendment strictures].” Mary-Rose
Papandrea, Where Intellectual Property and Free Speech Collide, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1307, 1307 (2009).
81
See the discussion of Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 572 (1977), infra
notes 99–105 and accompanying text.
82
See, e.g., Note, First Amendment — Right of Publicity — Missouri Supreme Court Creates
“Predominant Purpose” Test for First Amendment Defenses to Publicity Right Claims. — Doe v. TCI
Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003), cert. denied sub nom. Twist v. McFarlane, 2004 WL 46675
(U.S. Jan 12, 2004) (No. 03-615), 117 HARV. L. REV. 1275, 1275 (2004) (“The extent to which the First
Amendment protects a defendant in a right of publicity case is an issue that has vexed courts and
commentators . . . .”).
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of right-of-publicity law that leads courts constantly to invoke the First
Amendment.
One way to see the nature of the problem is to look at this through the
lens of constitutional avoidance. As a general matter, courts seek to avoid
reaching constitutional questions by interpreting statutes in a way that
prevents serious doubts about their constitutionality.83 But that principle is
frequently thrown to the wind in right-of-publicity cases, as the First
Amendment often seems to be the first thing courts reach for in explaining
why a plaintiff must lose in everyday cases.84
Some legal authorities do seek to conform to norms of constitutional
avoidance insofar they may bring in free expression rights under some
banner other than the First Amendment. For instance, First Amendmenttype concerns may be addressed under the label of a “newsworthiness”
exception or privilege.85 California’s statute, for instance, has a “news” and
“public affairs” exception that serves as a statute-based means of bringing
free speech protections to bear without directly invoking the First
Amendment.86 And sometimes courts seek to introduce some sheltering
vagueness by using “First Amendment” as an adjective, speaking in terms
of “First Amendment considerations.”87 Notwithstanding the occasional
nods to constitutional avoidance, however, there is an epidemic of courts
dealing with right-of-publicity litigation by directly invoking the First
Amendment without first trying to re-interpret statutory language or clarify
common law doctrine.88

83

See Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court,
2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181, 181–82 (explaining that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance “encourages a
court to adopt one of several plausible interpretations of a statute in order to avoid deciding a tough
constitutional question”). The doctrine is “also known as the ‘avoidance canon.’” Id. at 181.
84
I discuss examples of this below.
85
Lane v. Random House, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 141, 146 (D.D.C. 1995) (“The newsworthiness
privilege applies to advertisements for books, films, and other publications concerning matters of public
interest. A plaintiff cannot recover for misappropriation based upon the use of his identity or likeness in
a newsworthy publication unless the use has ‘no real relationship’ to the subject matter of the
publication.” (citation omitted)).
86
Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(d) (2016) (“For purposes of this section, a use of a name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness in connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or
any political campaign, shall not constitute a use for which consent is required under subdivision (a).”).
87
E.g., Ruffin-Steinback v. dePasse, 82 F. Supp. 2d 723, 730 (E.D. Mich. 2000), aff’d, 267 F.3d
457 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Furthermore, to the extent that courts have been reluctant to extend the right of
publicity to depictions of life-stories based on First Amendment considerations, those considerations are
no less relevant whether the work in question is fictional, non-fictional or a combination of the two.”
(citation omitted)).
88
For an example of this, see infra note 97 (discussing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co.,
433 U.S. 562, 563 (1977)).

912

111:891 (2017)

Right to Publicity

The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the right of publicity and its
interaction with the First Amendment only once. Zacchini v. ScrippsHoward Broadcasting Co. concerned a claim under Ohio law brought by
“human cannonball” Hugo Zacchini, who performed his daredevil act at the
Geauga County Fair in Burton, Ohio.89 In a performance that lasted all of
15 seconds, Zacchini was shot from a cannon to land in a net about 200 feet
away.90 The dispute arose out of a visit by a freelance reporter with a video
camera. When Zacchini first saw the man, he asked him not to film his
performance.91 And the reporter initially complied.92 But the next day, on
instructions from a news producer, the reporter returned to the fair and
videoed the entire act, which was then shown on the local news.93 Zacchini
sued. The broadcast of his cannonball act apparently offended his sense of
family pride: Zacchini asserted that the act, which his father invented, had
been performed exclusively by the Zacchini family for the past half
century.94
As plaintiff, Zacchini pursued his lawsuit on a variety of claims that
ultimately proved unworkable, including the tort of conversion and a claim
based on a purported common law copyright.95 The Ohio Supreme Court,
however, did entertain his suit on the basis of a “right to the publicity value
of his performance.”96 Although the Ohio high court impliedly recognized
that Zacchini had proved a prima facie violation of the right of publicity,
the court nonetheless ruled in favor of the broadcaster on the basis of the
First Amendment.97
At the U.S. Supreme Court, Zacchini vaulted the First Amendment to
a win with a 5–4 decision authored by Justice Byron White that

89

433 U.S. at 563.
Id.
91
Id. at 563–64.
92
Id. at 564.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 565 (quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 351 N.E.2d 454, 455 (Ohio 1976),
rev’d and remanded, 433 U.S. 562 (1977)). The blackletter law from Ohio that the U.S. Supreme Court
understood the cause of action to rest on was “first that one may not use for his own benefit the name or
likeness of another, whether or not the use or benefit is a commercial one, and second that respondent
would be liable for the appropriation, over petitioner’s objection and in the absence of license or
privilege, of petitioner’s right to the publicity value of his performance.” Id.; see also Zacchini, 351
N.E.2d at 459–60.
97
Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 565–66. The U.S. Supreme Court noted specifically that the Ohio Supreme
Court did not rest on state law, and that it was because of the lack of an adequate and independent state
ground that the U.S. Supreme Court appropriately granted certiorari to decide the First Amendment
issue. Id. at 566.
90
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emphasized the economic-incentive rationale of the right of publicity.98
Observing that perfecting the human cannonball act required great talent
and effort, Justice White reasoned that “if the public can see the act free on
television, it will be less willing to pay to see it at the fair.”99 Broadcasting
the act on TV thus “poses a substantial threat to the economic value” of
Zacchini’s act.”100
In this way, Justice White’s opinion found the state’s interest in
protecting an individual’s proprietary interest to encourage such
entertainment101 to be persuasive in allowing the right-of-publicity claim to
proceed—the First Amendment notwithstanding:
Ohio’s decision to protect petitioner’s right of publicity here rests on more
than a desire to compensate the performer for the time and effort invested in
his act; the protection provides an economic incentive for him to make the
investment required to produce a performance of interest to the public. This
same consideration underlies the patent and copyright laws long enforced by
this Court. . . . These laws . . . were intended definitely to grant valuable,
enforceable rights in order to afford greater encouragement to the production
of works of benefit to the public. The Constitution does not prevent Ohio from
making a similar choice here in deciding to protect the entertainer’s incentive
in order to encourage the production of this type of work.102

By putting the right of publicity into the same constitutional basket as
copyright, the Supreme Court’s rationale gave the right of publicity a
powerful shield to blunt what blows the First Amendment might strike
against it. Wendy Gordon notes that because copyrights are classified as
property, “courts seem willing to overlook the most basic canons of the law
of free expression.”103 Enforcing a prior restraint against speech, as she
points out, is “one of the most troublesome things a judge can do under
classic First Amendment jurisprudence. . . . Yet in copyright cases judges
routinely enjoin books prior to publication without even appearing to notice
the anomaly.”104 And while defamation law—as a species of tort—is
subject to intensive First Amendment policing, copyright—as a species of
intellectual property—tends to get a free pass under the First

98

Id. at 575.
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 573 (“[T]he State’s interest in permitting a ‘right of publicity’ is in protecting the
proprietary interest of the individual in his act in part to encourage such entertainment.” (footnote
omitted)).
102
Id. at 576–77 (internal quotation marks, citations, and footnotes omitted).
103
Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1536 (1993).
104
Id. at 1536–37.
99

914

111:891 (2017)

Right to Publicity

Amendment.105 Thus, by analogizing the right of publicity to copyrights,
Zacchini seems to have given the right of publicity exceptional status with
regard to free expression guarantees.106
The fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has not revisited the right of
publicity since Zacchini seems to be a clear signal that state legislatures
and courts are free to apply and even expand the right of publicity with
little worry about First Amendment impingement. In this vein, it is
particularly telling to consider the appellate posture of Zacchini. The Ohio
Supreme Court fettered its own common law by imposing First
Amendment limitations, and the U.S. Supreme Court reversed on the basis
that the First Amendment did not function to limit the Ohio law as the Ohio
court had said it did.
Why then, if the U.S. Supreme Court has signaled that the First
Amendment will treat the right of publicity with a light touch, have lower
and state courts brought the hammer of the First Amendment down on the
right of publicity over and over again? It is part of the right of publicity’s
dysmorphia that courts interpreting state law have reached for the First
Amendment to bash the doctrine into the shape they want. That is, instead
of the First Amendment providing an externally imposed outer boundary
on the reach of state law, courts have been using free speech rights to laser
away unwanted liability.
Examples abound, but I will start with three cases. In Guglielmi v.
Spelling-Goldberg Productions, a 1979 California Supreme Court case, the
court held that a motion picture about silent film heartthrob actor Rudolph
Valentino was protected from right-of-publicity liability on the basis of the
First Amendment.107 In New Kids on the Block v. News America, a 1992
case, a California federal court used the First Amendment to halt a right-of105

Id. at 1537 (“Similarly, in libel and related areas of tort law the Supreme Court has held that the
First Amendment requires giving the defendant special privileges, yet no constitutional privileges are
provided when suits are brought under copyright or trademark. It is supposed that as long as ideas are
free for all to use, no harm to free speech can result from forbidding the copying of expression.”
(footnotes omitted)). Note that since Gordon wrote, the First Amendment has been significantly brought
to bear on some of the more expansive and leading-edge invocations of trademark. See, e.g., Mattel,
Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The First Amendment may offer little
protection for a competitor who labels its commercial good with a confusingly similar mark, but
trademark rights do not entitle the owner to quash an unauthorized use of the mark by another who is
communicating ideas or expressing points of view. Were we to ignore the expressive value that some
marks assume, trademark rights would grow to encroach upon the zone protected by the First
Amendment.” (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted)).
106
It should be noted that part of the rationale for copyright’s quasi-immunity from the First
Amendment comes from the understanding that copyright’s idea/expression dichotomy and fair-use
defense give copyright “built-in First Amendment accommodations.” Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,
190 (2003) (citation omitted).
107
603 P.2d 454, 458 (Cal. 1979).

915

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

publicity claim by a boy band against a newspaper using the band
members’ names in connection with a pay-to-call 1-900-number survey to
determine the most popular or sexiest New Kid.108 In Gionfriddo v. Major
League Baseball, a 2001 case, a California court held that the First
Amendment privileged professional baseball to print game-day programs,
publish websites, and release documentaries with names and identities of
retired ballplayers who had never given their consent for such commercial
exploitations—actions that, otherwise, would ostensibly qualify as common
law right-of-publicity infringement.109
Guglielmi, New Kids on the Block, and Gionfriddo illustrate the wide
array of cases in which the First Amendment is applied as a constraint. But
note that neither Guglielmi, nor New Kids on the Block, nor Gionfriddo fall
into any of the three categories of endorsement right, merchandising
entitlement, or right against virtual impressment.110
One area in which the First Amendment has been used repeatedly to
strike down right-of-publicity claims is in the context of non-fictional
books. A leading case is Matthews v. Wozencraft, in which the Fifth Circuit
decided that the First Amendment barred a former law-enforcement
officer’s right-of-publicity claim for portraying his life in a book and
movie.111 The cases do not disclose a per se rule making biographies First
Amendment protected, but biography cases have led to consistent
defendant victories.112 While the First Amendment interest in non-fiction
books is clearly strong, courts could reach the same result in these cases
without confronting free speech rights at all by noting that non-fiction
constitutes neither endorsement, nor merchandizing, nor virtual
impressment.
A case that may illustrate how the First Amendment can be an ill fit in
right-of-publicity cases is C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing, Inc. v. Major
League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., in which the Eighth Circuit used
the First Amendment to stop a right-of-publicity claim against the use of

108

745 F. Supp. 1540, 1545 (C.D. Cal. 1990), aff’d, 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).
114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 314 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). The court stopped short of saying that a cause
of action was stated for common law right-of-publicity infringement, because it proceeded straight to
the constitutional analysis. Id. at 313.
110
That is not to say that one couldn’t make the argument that one or more of these cases are a
close call with one of the categories. In fact, the extent to which that might be true could be seen as the
unarticulated motivation for litigating the case to the appellate stage.
111
15 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1994).
112
See Ruffin-Steinback v. dePasse, 82 F. Supp. 2d 723, 730 (E.D. Mich. 2000), aff’d, 267 F.3d
457 (6th Cir. 2001) (analyzing cases and observing that “courts have been reluctant to extend the right
of publicity to depictions of life-stories based on First Amendment considerations”).
109
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baseball players’ names in fantasy baseball games.113 Complainant C.B.C.,
a provider of web-based fantasy baseball services, sought declaratory
judgment that its game-running services did not violate the rights of
publicity held by Major League Baseball (MLB) players.114 The Eighth
Circuit held that C.B.C.’s conduct was, under Missouri law, sufficient for a
prima facie right-of-publicity infringement case.115 But the Eighth Circuit
used the First Amendment to bar the claim, cutting a large swath out of the
nominal scope of the right of publicity.116
The C.B.C. case is interesting as an example of the strained way in
which Zacchini has been dealt with by lower courts. C.B.C. cited Zacchini
for the proposition that “[t]he Supreme Court has directed that state law
rights of publicity must be balanced against first amendment
considerations.”117 It is a peculiar citation, because the Zacchini case did
not say rights of publicity must be balanced with the First Amendment—
nor, even, is it fair to say the U.S. Supreme Court implied this.118
Nonetheless, proceeding to the First Amendment balancing it felt
obliged to do under Zacchini, the C.B.C. court weighed heavily the “public
value of information about the game of baseball and its players,” referring
to the “substantial public interest” in the “recitation and discussion of
factual data concerning the athletic performance of [MLB players].”119 And
the court gave little weight to economic interests of baseball players,
observing that “major league baseball players are rewarded, and
handsomely, too, for their participation in games and can earn additional
large sums from endorsements and sponsorship arrangements.”120
Comparing these two sets of interests, the court concluded “CBC’s first
amendment rights in offering its fantasy baseball products supersede the
players’ rights of publicity.”121

113

505 F.3d 818, 824 (8th Cir. 2007). Fantasy baseball “allows ordinary people to act as the owner
and general manager of an imaginary baseball team made up of Major League Baseball (MLB)
players. . . .” Robert T. Razzano, Intellectual Property and Baseball Statistics: Can Major League
Baseball Take Its Fantasy Ball and Go Home?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1157, 1157 (2006). The game works
by allowing fantasy team owners to draft and trade players, with the winner being determined by
aggregating statistics from the ballplayer’s real-world statistics. Id. at 1160–61.
114
C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc., 505 F.3d at 820.
115
Id. at 822–23.
116
Id. at 824.
117
Id. at 823.
118
See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977).
119
C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc., 505 F.3d at 823–24 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
120
Id. at 824.
121
Id.
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Viewed exclusively through a First Amendment lens, the C.B.C
decision is strange when considered alongside other right-of-publicity
decisions. For instance, a right-of-publicity cause of action has been upheld
in the cases of celebrity identities being used on buttons, posters, and tshirts122—all of which are much more straight-forwardly within the First
Amendment sphere, being vehicles of viewpoint-bearing communication,
than the game of fantasy baseball.123 Notably, however, the use of player
names in fantasy baseball does not fit easily within the categories of
endorsement, merchandizing, or virtual impressment.
The same free speech interests upheld by the First Amendment in
right-of-publicity cases are sometimes pursued under other labels. In
Minnesota, for instance, the courts recognize a “newsworthiness defense”
to the right of publicity, which “is akin to a First Amendment privilege and
arises from the same roots as that privilege.”124 The Minnesota case of
Dryer v. National Football League held that a former football player’s
right-of-publicity claim for the use of old film footage in new
documentary-style television productions was barred by the
newsworthiness privilege125—notwithstanding that the passage of three or
four decades would seem to take subject matter out of the category of
“news.”126 But while an ill fit for newsworthiness, Dryer makes sense as a
case that involves neither endorsement, nor merchandizing, nor virtual
impressment.
New York has recognized a newsworthiness exception as well—and
has also applied it in surprisingly broad ways. In Stephano v. News Group
Publications, Inc., a model plaintiff’s right-of-publicity claim was rejected
where photos for which he posed were used for more than the one article to
which he had agreed.127 The photo sued over featured the plaintiff modeling
a bomber jacket. The newsworthiness value of the photo—the jacket had a
“‘fun fur’ collar” and would be on sale the following week at
Bloomingdale’s128—seems strained, to say the least. But it does seem clear

122

See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978) (posters); Bi-Rite v. Button
Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (buttons); Comedy III Prods. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797
(Cal. 2001) (t-shirts). These cases are discussed below. See infra notes 224–26 and accompanying text.
123
Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (overturning, on the basis of the First
Amendment, a criminal conviction of a man for wearing a jacket bearing the words “Fuck the Draft” in
a courthouse).
124
Dryer v. Nat’l Football League, 55 F. Supp. 3d 1181, 1199 (D. Minn. 2014).
125
Id.
126
Plaintiff Fred Dryer played football in the NFL from 1969 to 1981. Id. at 1186.
127
Stephano v. News Grp. Publ’ns, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 581–82 (N.Y. 1984).
128
Id. at 582.
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that as an editorial photo spread as opposed to an ad, the usage tread on
none of the rights of endorsement, merchandizing, or virtual impressment.
In the overall calculus, the cases reveal that the right of publicity is not
merely constrained by free speech interests. The doctrine gets much of its
essential shape from courts’ habitual use of free-speech-type defenses,
even as the application of these defenses is often incoherent.
2. Copyright Preemption.—Another subtrahend that cuts the scope
of the right of publicity down to a tenable size is copyright preemption.
Compared with the ubiquity of free speech jurisprudence in right-ofpublicity decisions, copyright preemption is more rare.129 Nonetheless,
copyright preemption seems to play a substantial role as a pressure-relief
valve for the extreme expansiveness of the right of publicity’s blackletter
doctrine. The fact is, some claims that are at odds with our right-ofpublicity intuitions do not lend themselves to disposal through a free
speech defense.
A brief background on copyright law may be helpful before delving
into the role of copyright preemption in shaping the right of publicity:
Copyright provides a monopoly right over original works of authorship.130
Works of authorship is a broad category.131 It includes books, poems,
photographs, paintings, sculptures, and other modes of expression of
natural persons.132 There is no need to apply for a copyright—the copyright
in a work of authorship arises instantaneously when the work is “fixed in
any tangible medium of expression.”133 That means, for instance, that as
soon as creative expression is written down on paper, recorded to tape,
captured on film, or stored digitally by a computer, copyright protection
commences.
With the exception of sound recordings made before February 15,
1972, copyright law in the United States is exclusively federal134 and

129

See Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U. CAL. DAVIS
L. REV. 199, 225 (2002) (“[F]ew courts have found that copyright preempts the right of publicity. . . .”).
130
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (copyright provided for “original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
432 (1984).
131
See § 102(a)(1)–(8).
132
See, e.g., Selby v. New Line Cinema Corp., 96 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1059 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(discussing breadth of subject matter of copyright).
133
See § 102(a); see also Express, LLC v. Fetish Grp., Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1218 (C.D. Cal.
2006) (“[A] copyright exists as soon as the original expression is fixed in a tangible medium.”).
134
See § 301 (exclusivity of federal law in copyright; excepting sound recordings made before
February 15, 1972); Holly M. Sharp, Comment, The Day the Music Died: How Overly Extended
Copyright Terms Threaten the Very Existence of Our Nation’s Earliest Musical Works, 57 EMORY L.J.
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preempts state law. There is an express preemption provision at 17 U.S.C.
§ 301.135 In addition, generally applicable theories of federal preemption—
not based on an express statutory provision—would appear to apply to
copyright as well.136 Like other invocations of preemption in litigation,
copyright preemption is an affirmative defense.137
A leading case regarding the application of copyright preemption to a
right-of-publicity claim is the Ninth Circuit’s 2006 case, Laws v. Sony
Music Entertainment, Inc.138 The case is particularly interesting because its
awkward, improbable reasoning regarding preemption demonstrates how
right of publicity’s doctrinal crisis can put other law under strain.
The dispute arose out of the 2002 song “All I Have,” recorded by
Jennifer Lopez and LL Cool J for Epic Records. That song used a sample
containing the voice of R&B singer Debra Laws, from her 1981 ballad
“Very Special,” an Elektra Records release.139 Epic’s parent, Sony Music
Entertainment, obtained a license for the sound-recording sample from
Warner Special Products, Inc., which acted as agent for Elektra/Asylum
Records, owner of the sound-recording copyright in “Very Special.”140 But
although Sony got the license for the sound-recording copyright, Sony did
not seek permission from Laws to use her voice, nor was Laws
compensated in any way for Sony’s usage.141
Based on the use of her voice in “All I Have,” Laws sued Sony for
common law right-of-publicity misappropriation and misappropriation
under California’s right-of-publicity statute, Civil Code § 3344.142 Because
the blackletter scope of the right of publicity is so broad, Laws had a clear-

279, 284–88 (2007) (explaining that copyright law applied to sound recordings made before February
15, 1972).
135
§ 301.
136
See Rothman, supra note 129, at 208, 242–43 (discussing the applicability of generally
applicable preemption theories derived from the Supremacy Clause in the copyright context).
137
See, e.g., Smith v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 14 C 5704, 2015 WL 350981, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27,
2015) (holding that preemption is an affirmative defense in the context of the Interstate Commerce
Commission Termination Act of 1995); 6 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 18:8.50 (2016)
(noting that copyright preemption is an affirmative defense).
138
448 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2006).
139
Id. at 1136, 1138, 1143.
140
Id. at 1136; Shirley Halperin, Who Destroyed Epic Records?, BILLBOARDBIZ (Nov. 17, 2010,
12:00
AM),
http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/1197460/who-destroyed-epic-records
[https://perma.cc/P67W-JDN4] (Epic owned by Sony). The Laws court reported that “[t]he agreement
required Sony to include a credit stating, ‘Featuring samples from the Debra Laws recording “Very
Special”’ in any reproduction.” Laws, 448 F.3d at 1136. Interestingly, “All I Have,” when purchased
from iTunes, does not include this credit. (Digital file information on file with author.).
141
Laws, 448 F.3d at 1136.
142
Id.
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cut violation to sue over: There was a commercial exploitation. And it was
of Laws’ voice, identifiable as Laws’.
The Laws court declined to say anything about whether a claim had
been stated. Instead, the opinion skipped straight to the affirmative defense
of copyright preemption. The court applied a two-part test for preemption
under 17 U.S.C. § 301, copyright law’s express preemption provision.143
According to the Laws court, a claim is preempted under § 301 if (1) the
subject matter of the plaintiff’s right-of-publicity claims comes within the
subject matter of copyright and (2) the state-law rights asserted by the
plaintiff are equivalent to those created under the federal copyright
statute.144
The court held Laws’ claim preempted. The court’s analysis,
particularly with regard to the first prong, is largely inscrutable. The court
seemed to be persuaded by Sony’s argument that “once a voice becomes
part of a sound recording in a fixed tangible medium it comes within the
subject matter of copyright law.”145 This cannot be right, however. If this
were how a court is to construe the subject matter of copyright, then almost
all right-of-publicity claims would be preempted by copyright.146 All uses
of voices and likenesses in print, on film, in audio recordings, or affixed to
any lunch box, coffee mug, or t-shirt would be preempted. To take just one
example, Zacchini’s claim regarding his human cannonball act would be
preempted under the Laws logic, since his performance was fixed on
film.147 In fact, with the exception of perhaps a handful of live-performance
cases, every right-of-publicity case arising since 1989, when copyright law
changed so that copyright attaches immediately upon fixation,148 involves
the plaintiff’s name, likeness, voice, or other indicia of identity being
incorporated into a copyrighted work.
In trying to make sense of the Laws court’s work, one might initially
suspect that what the court was actually talking about is an implied license
theory—that Laws impliedly licensed her right of publicity as part of her
recording deal with Elektra. That, however, cannot be the explanation,
because it was apparently undisputed in the case that Laws had not given
Elektra a sublicensable right to exploit her voice in the future beyond the

143

Id.
Id.
145
See id. at 1139.
146
That is, assuming they also meet the second prong of the test. That second prong does not
winnow the field either, however, as I discuss next.
147
See supra note 89 and accompanying text regarding the Zacchini case.
148
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568 §§ 7(e), 9(a), 102 Stat.
2858–59 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 405, 408(a) (2012)) (neither notice nor registration is required).
144
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distribution of her own records.149 Thus an implied license theory cannot
explain the court’s holding.150
The Laws court strained to distinguish various cases that seem
incompatible with its holding. A particular problem for the Laws court
were two Ninth Circuit cases that upheld right-of-publicity claims for
commercial exploitation of the plaintiff’s voice: one where Bette Midler’s
voice was imitated in a Ford television advertisement and another where
Tom Waits’ voice was imitated in a Doritos radio commercial.151 The Laws
court distinguished both on the basis that the voices were imitated, rather
than copied verbatim.152 The court’s implication was that the imitated
voices were not the subject of copyright. Yet in both Midler and Waits, the
imitation voices were fixed in the sound recording for the advertisement,
and as such, they were then within the subject matter of copyright—at least
as the Laws court had construed the concept.
Another case that would seem to be incompatible with the Laws
holding was Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc.153 There, the Seventh Circuit held
that model June Toney’s right-of-publicity claim was not preempted by
copyright where she sued the L’Oreal cosmetics company for using her
image in advertising and on packaging after the expiration of L’Oreal’s
endorsement deal with Toney.154 The Laws court clumsily attempted to
distinguish Toney on the grounds that the defendants in that case had each,
at some point, owned the copyright to the photo bearing the plaintiff’s
likeness.155 By contrast, Sony had only licensed the “Very Special” sound
recording, not owned it outright.156 This logic, if taken seriously, would
have bizarre implications. For one, it would mean that copyright licensees
have a greater ability to exploit a copyrighted work than the copyright
owner does.

149

Laws, 448 F.3d at 1143–44.
An additional reason the implied license theory does not greatly help explain the court’s holding
is that implied license is its own robust defense to right-of-publicity infringement. So, a court wanting
to invoke the implied-license concept could do so straightforwardly, without engaging the issue of
copyright preemption.
151
Those cases are Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting a preemption argument to uphold a right-of-publicity claim based on the imitation of Bette Midler’s voice in
a Ford commercial) and Waits v. Frito–Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1112 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding claim
for the imitation of musician Tom Waits’ voice in a Doritos commercial).
152
Laws, 448 F.3d at 1140–41.
153
406 F.3d 905 (7th Cir. 2005).
154
Id. at 908–10.
155
Laws, 448 F.3d at 1142.
156
See id.
150
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While the Laws case is impossible to make sense of on its own terms,
its result, along with the results of the cases it sought to distinguish,
conforms without difficulty to a three-rights framework view of the right of
publicity. Midler, Waits, and Toney were each endorsement cases, thus a
right-of-publicity cause of action was upheld, notwithstanding the specter
of copyright preemption. The usage in Laws, however, does not fit as
endorsement, merchandizing, or virtual impressment.157
Many cases have followed the illogic of Laws in using copyright
preemption against right-of-publicity claims. And they can be reconciled in
the same way. In Aronson v. Dog Eat Dog Films, Inc., a 2010 case,
plaintiff Ken Aronson took video of himself and a friend during a trip to
England.158 When the video was used in Michael Moore’s feature-film
documentary Sicko, Aronson sued for copyright infringement and right-ofpublicity infringement. The court held his right-of-publicity claim was
preempted by copyright since his voice and image were fixed in a
copyrighted videotape.159 In another 2010 case, Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v.
144942 Canada Inc., an adult film performer, director, and producer sued
for right-of-publicity infringement over the unauthorized distribution and
marketing of films he had made and performed in.160 The court held that his
claim was preempted by copyright because the subject of the alleged
misappropriation was “contained within a copyrighted medium.”161 In Ray
v. ESPN, Inc., a 2014 Missouri case, Steve “Wild Thing” Ray, a former
professional wrestler, sued over television network ESPN’s use of film
clips that depicted him in the ring.162 The court in Ray followed Laws in
holding that since Ray’s likeness was contained within a copyrighted film,
it was preempted by copyright.163 The most sensible explanation for the
maladroit reasoning in these cases is that the right of publicity’s stated
blackletter scope is erroneously broad, and the right of publicity does not,
in fact, generally create liability for commercial exploitation of indicia of
identity of natural persons. Commercial use of a person’s identity in
advertising does—as in the Midler, Waits, and Toney cases. But the
gravamina of the other cases fail to fit within the advertising/endorsement
ambit or within the scope of merchandizing or virtual impressment.
157

The closest would be virtual impressment, a right-of-publicity species implicitly recognized by
at least some courts. See infra Section III.C.
158
738 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1108 (W.D. Wash. 2010).
159
See id. at 1114–16.
160
617 F.3d 1146, 1149–50 (9th Cir. 2010).
161
Id. at 1153 (quoting Laws, 448 F.3d at 1141).
162
No. 13–1179–CV–W–SOW, 2014 WL 2766187, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 8, 2014), aff’d, 783 F.3d
1140 (8th Cir. 2015).
163
Id. at *5.
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So, in the end, Laws and the cases following it got to the right result,
but copyright preemption did not have—and logically could not have
had—anything to do with it.
There is an alternative way, proposed by David Nimmer, to try to
make sense of the work of the courts on copyright preemption and the right
of publicity. But the approach is ultimately unconvincing. Nimmer’s
suggestion is that when a use of a person’s identity is in an advertisement
or is otherwise “for purposes of trade,” then it is not preempted, whereas if
it is for “expressive works,” then a right-of-publicity claim is preempted.164
The first problem with this view is that, as far as copyright is concerned,
advertisements are expressive works, and in terms of what is protectable,
copyright does not draw a distinction between advertisements and works
with a higher “expressive” value.165 Copyright, in fact, famously refuses to
draw a distinction between works on the basis of low or high artistic
value.166 If copyright does not observe such a distinction in terms of
protectability, why should it in terms of preemption? The second, more
general problem with Nimmer’s view is that it is needlessly ad hoc and
complex, as Nimmer’s theory ultimately takes the form of an exception to
an exception. The more cogent explanation is simply that the right of
publicity itself does not extend liability to portrayals in non-advertising,
non-merchandizing, non-virtual-impressment contexts.
3. Other Subtrahends.—Beyond the application of free speech rights
and copyright preemption, there are other means occasionally employed by
the courts to avoid allowing plaintiffs to proceed where a right-of-publicity
claim, though supported by the nominal blackletter doctrine, is nonetheless
at odds with judicial intuition.
Many courts have applied an “incidental use” exception to the right of
publicity. For instance, in Benally v. Hundred Arrows Press, Inc.,167 a court
in New Mexico cited “incidental use” in granting summary judgment for a
defendant publisher who used a photograph of the plaintiff in an article
about the photographer.168 The Benally use is one that would fail to
164

See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][I]
(Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2016); see also Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1029–30 (3d
Cir. 2008) (discussing Nimmer’s theory).
165
See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903) (holding that
advertisements are protected by copyright).
166
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote, “It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained
only [in] the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of
the narrowest and most obvious limits.” See id. at 251.
167
614 F. Supp. 969 (D.N.M. 1985), rev’d on other grounds, 858 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1988).
168
Id. at 979. The court’s analysis appears to arise from misconstruing the Restatement’s mention
of “incidental.”
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establish a prima facie case under the three-rights view of the right of
publicity.
Other courts seem to have selectively ignored the law or facts—a
phenomenon that one could call “judge nullification” or “bench
nullification.”169
An example of selectively ignoring the law can be found in Landham
v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc.170 Actor Sonny Landham sued a toy company
under Kentucky law over his apparent depiction in the form of an action
figure for Billy—a camo-clad, machine-gun-wielding operative whom
Landham portrayed in the 1987 movie Predator alongside Arnold
Schwarzenegger.171 The court affirmed summary judgment against the
plaintiff’s statutory right-of-publicity cause of action on the basis that the
identity of the plaintiff, whom the court derided as a “fringe actor”172 was
not shown to have “significant commercial value.”173 In support of its
assertion that the law required this showing, the court cited common law
cases not considering the Kentucky statute.174 Yet Kentucky’s statute very
clearly has no requirement that a person be a celebrity or that her or his
identity have significant commercial value.175
An example of spuriously characterizing the facts of a case to avoid
right-of-publicity liability can be found in Polydoros v. Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp.,176 in which the California Court of Appeal considered a
right-of-publicity claim177 brought against a studio for the film The
Sandlot.178

169

With this phrasing, I mean to draw an analogy to jury nullification. The phrase “judge
nullification” has been employed sporadically in the past. See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing
Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 831 & n.213 (1997) (using
the phrase to describe judge’s departure from doctrine in certain scientifically complex cases where
fairness concerns sided with plaintiffs in toxic tort cases). I thank Greg Gordon for suggesting the
phrase “bench nullification.”
170
227 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2000).
171
Id. at 621; PREDATOR (1987), IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0093773/ [https://perma.cc/
2SMN-C8XV].
172
Landham, 227 F.3d at 621.
173
Id. at 624.
174
Id.
175
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170(1) (2017) (“The General Assembly recognizes that a person
has property rights in his name and likeness which are entitled to protection from commercial
exploitation.”). Confirming the plain language of the statute is a separate provision that provides for a
fifty-year post-mortem right for a person who is a “public figure.” Id. § 391.170(2).
176
79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 207 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
177
The court generally referred to the plaintiff’s common law claim as one for “invasion of
privacy” or “commercial appropriation.” Id. at 208.
178
Id.
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In the movie, a “comedic coming-of-age story set in . . . the 1960’s,”179
a new kid moves into a San Fernando, California neighborhood and tries to
fit in by joining the local sandlot baseball team.180 Hijinks ensue. The film
was well received by many. Famed film critic Roger Ebert gushed about
the absorbing world created by the movie.181 Ironically, Ebert also wrote
that the film doesn’t have “any connection with the humdrum reality of the
boring real world,” and he saluted its ability to “tap directly into a vein of
nostalgia and memory that makes reality seem puny by comparison.”182
Contrary to how Ebert saw it, plaintiff Michael Polydoros perceived a
very tight connection between the movie and real life. In particular,
Michael Polydoros thought his resemblance to the film’s “Michael
Palledorous” character was no coincidence.183 Polydoros had a number of
compelling facts on this score. Both the plaintiff and the character grew up
in a similar neighborhood in the early 1960s.184 Both the plaintiff and the
character played sandlot baseball with friends.185 Both swam in a
community pool.186 Moreover, as the court acknowledged, “A photograph
of [the plaintiff] dating from the 1960’s is similar to a photograph of the
Palledorous character in the movie, right down to appellant’s eyeglasses
and the color and design of his shirt.”187 The character and the plaintiff also
shared the characteristic—according to the court—of being “somewhat
obstreperous.”188
Given these compelling similarities between The Sandlot’s world and
the real world, it will come as no surprise that writer–director David
Mickey Evans and the plaintiff were schoolmates when growing up.189
Overall, the undisputed facts clearly showed that Polydoros’ name,
identity, and likeness had been appropriated. In terms of alleging a prima
facie case under the blackletter law, Polydoros had it made. Under

179

Id.
See Roger Ebert, The Sandlot, ROGEREBERT.COM (Apr. 7, 1993), http://www.rogerebert.com/
reviews/the-sandlot-1993 [https://perma.cc/ L6X3-GLUN].
181
Ebert explained what happened when one character hit a line drive: “I ducked and held up my
mitt, and then I realized I didn’t have a mitt, and it was then I also realized how completely this movie
had seduced me with its memories of what really matters when you are 12.” Id.
182
Id.
183
Polydoros, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 208. It is not clear from the case whether there was any difference in
pronunciation in the names of the character and the plaintiff.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id.
180
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California common law, “an individual’s right to publicity is invaded if
another appropriates for his advantage the individual’s name, image,
identity or likeness.”190 It cannot seriously be disputed that Polydoros had
proved his case by this standard. Yet the intuitive result would be that no
right-of-publicity violation should lie.
The Polydoros court could have confronted head-on the
uncomfortable breadth of the blackletter law and its failure to conform to a
collective intuition about the right of publicity. It did not. Instead, the court
proceeded to boldly draw one implausible factual inference after another
until it reached the result that made intuitive sense.191
The court explained “there was a marked difference in age and
appearance between our appellant, the 40-year-old Michael Polydoros, and
the 10-year-old character of Squints Palledorous.”192 The court said this
notwithstanding that the film portrayed events happening thirty years
earlier.193 “No person seeing this film could confuse the two,”194 the court
then asserted—a conclusion belied by, among other things, the court’s
mention that after the movie people had begun calling the plaintiff by the
movie character’s nickname, “Squints.”195
As with preposterously reasoned cases using the banner of the First
Amendment or copyright preemption, the result of Polydoros can be
justified with reference to a particularized depiction of the right of publicity
as three distinct rights: the studio’s use of Polydoros’ indicia of identity
was neither for endorsement, nor merchandizing, nor virtual impressment.

190

Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 649 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
The Polydoros opinion’s factual analysis is reminiscent of the “Jedi mind trick.” In the original
Star Wars movie, sage hero and Jedi knight Obi-Wan Kenobi, traveling with Luke Skywalker and two
fugitive droids, is stopped by stormtroopers of the evil Empire. Waiving his hand and speaking in a
soothing voice, Obi-Wan says to the stormtroopers, “These are not the droids you’re looking for.”
Mesmerized, the lead stormtrooper announces, “These are not the droids we’re looking for.”
Radio9704, These Aren’t the Droids You’re Looking for. . ., YOUTUBE (Aug. 9, 2014),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=532j-186xEQ [https://perma.cc/A8DN-V4FU]; see also Jillian
Todd Weiss, The Gender Caste System: Identity, Privacy, and Heteronormativity, 10 L. & SEXUALITY
123, 132 n.26 (2001) (referencing the scene in analogy to avoiding questions of gender identity); Anne
E. Mullins, Jedi or Judge: How the Human Mind Redefines Judicial Opinions, 16 WYO. L. REV. 325,
325–26 (2016) (referencing the scene in discussing how the persuasiveness of judicial writing can work
on an unconscious level).
192
Polydoros, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 210 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). In this, the court cited to Aguilar v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 219 Cal. Rptr. 891 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), which made a similar move with
regard to the plaintiff’s age.
193
Downplaying the similarity of names—Michael Polydoros and Michael Palledorous—notice
that the court replaced the character name “Michael” with “Squints,” which was the character’s
nickname. Id.
194
Id.
195
Id. at 208.
191
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III.

RE-CONCEPTUALIZING ONE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AS THREE

If right-of-publicity issues are to become more predictable and better
moored in sound policy and theory, we need to define the right of publicity
positively. We must be able to say what it is, not merely what it is not. That
is the aim of this Part, to build a positively-described picture of the right of
publicity—self-limited, such that it does not require free speech defenses,
copyright preemption, or other exceptions to give it its essential shape.
To do this, I divide the right of publicity into three separate rights: (1)
the endorsement right, (2) the merchandizing entitlement, and (3) the right
against virtual impressment. For clarity in developing the law going
forward, it would be best for courts to regard the violation of each to be a
distinct cause of action.
A couple of caveats. First, in attempting to delineate these three rights,
I mean to take no normative position on any of them. It is my intent to
leave entirely open the question of whether judicial or statutory recognition
of any of them is sound policy. My aim, instead, is to bring analytical
clarity to thinking about the law in this area by providing a structure that
imposes some meaningful order on the tangle of cases that currently are
found under the banner of the right of publicity. In fact, far from seeking to
champion or to oppose any of these rights, it is my hope that bringing some
clarity to the doctrine might enable a more productive and focused debate
on whether their legal recognition is a good idea.
Second, although this may be obvious, I wish to point out that I am
not making the claim that every single right-of-publicity case corresponds
with this three-rights schema. Rather, I assert that the three-rights approach
shows strong general correspondence to the results of cases, and viewing
cases through the three-rights lens reveals a great deal of coherence and
uniformity. Cases that do not conform might, of course, be thought of as
erroneous. Alternatively, they might be seen as purposefully nonadherent,
either seeking deliberately to recognize new areas of exclusive rights, or
interposing principled objections to a relatively new legal entitlement
whose wisdom remains very much a live issue.
A.

The Endorsement Right

The right of publicity has been consistently invoked with success
where the plaintiff has been unwittingly contrived to endorse commercial
goods or services. To sum up the corresponding right in a Restatementstyle manner:
Persons have a right not to be represented as making a commercial
endorsement or to appear in an advertisement in such a way that suggests
endorsement absent their specific consent. An identifiable use of a person in
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advertising for a product or service or on product packaging is generally a
violation.

In terms of the dignitary and reputational interests the endorsement
right protects, it shows a marked kinship with defamation, false light,
common law trademark, and the Lanham Act.196
The right not to be portrayed as endorsing a commercial enterprise
applies regardless of whether the person actually uses or recommends that
product.197 Thus, it would be a violation of the endorsement right for a boot
manufacturer to distribute an advertisement with a photo identifiably
depicting the plaintiff where the photo has been digitally altered to make it
appear that the plaintiff was wearing the defendant’s brand of boots, when,
in fact, the plaintiff was not actually wearing those boots. But it also would
be a violation of the endorsement right to use in an advertisement an
unaltered photo identifiably depicting a person wearing the defendant’s
boots, even when that person actually wore the defendant’s boots.
The existence of this endorsement right is well-supported by case law
in many jurisdictions. One of the earliest uses of a right-of-publicity-type
claim was for endorsement.198 In the 1905 case of Pavesich v. New England
Life Insurance Co., the Georgia Supreme Court recognized a cause of
action for “the publication of one’s picture without his consent by another,
as an advertisement, for the mere purpose of increasing the profits and
gains of the advertiser.”199 A picture of the plaintiff was used in a
newspaper ad for life insurance, attributing to him the entirely fictional
sentiment that he was glad he purchased insurance during the “healthy and
productive period” of his life.200 The plaintiff’s picture was juxtaposed with
a picture of a sickly looking man said to regret that he had not purchased
insurance when he could have.201

196

In fact, the action for false endorsement under the Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(A) has considerable
overlap, but the right of publicity’s endorsement/advertising liability is substantially broader. See, e.g.,
Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1014 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that to make out a false
endorsement case under § 43(a), “a plaintiff must show that: (1) its mark is legally protectable; (2) it
owns the mark; and (3) the defendant’s use of the mark to identify its goods or services is likely to
create confusion concerning the plaintiff’s sponsorship or approval of those goods or services”).
197
See Madow, supra note 2, at 231 (observing that the right of publicity can be used to enjoin
truthful representations about the association of a given celebrity and a given product).
198
Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
199
Id. Note that the court labeled the claim an invasion of the “right of privacy.” Id. at 69. The
court also, however, obliquely referenced a “right of publicity.” Id. at 70.
200
Id. at 68–69.
201
Id.
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The recognized birth-case of the right of publicity, Haelan
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,202 also acknowledged the
essence of the endorsement right by specifying that the right of publicity is
a means of allowing people to “receive[] money for authorizing
advertisements.”203
Many of the best-known right-of-publicity cases have been
endorsement-right cases. For instance, the 1974 Ninth Circuit case of
Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. upheld a right-of-publicity
cause of action for a magazine advertisement for Winston cigarettes.204 The
court characterized the claim as concerning “the alleged misappropriation
of [the plaintiff’s] name, likeness, personality, and endorsement.”205
Right-of-publicity cases that deal with endorsement rights may not
explicitly categorize themselves as such. In the 2001 case Downing v.
Abercrombie & Fitch, the Ninth Circuit upheld a right-of-publicity cause of
action brought by famed surfers against a trendy clothing retailer for their
depiction in a photograph used in an endorsement context.206 The plaintiff’s
photo appeared in a print publication, Abercrombie & Fitch Quarterly, that
was styled as a magazine but which functioned in essence as a catalog to
which one subscribed.207 The right-of-publicity claim in the case was
analyzed without any reference to endorsement being the crux of the
action.208 Yet the importance of the endorsement aspect of the case can be
discerned in other ways. For one, the endorsement aspect was central to the
court’s analysis of the surfers’ Lanham Act § 43(a)209 claim for “confusion
and deception indicating sponsorship of Abercrombie goods.”210 That
discussion centered on whether consumers were likely to be confused in
thinking that the plaintiff surfers had endorsed Abercrombie & Fitch.211 The
court concluded that “[a]ppellants have raised a genuine issue of material
fact concerning a likelihood of confusion as to their endorsement”; thus the

202

202 F.2d 866, 866 (2d Cir. 1953). For the full discussion of this case, see supra note 27 and
accompanying text.
203
Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868.
204
498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
205
Id. at 822 (italics added).
206
265 F.3d 994, 1008 (9th Cir. 2001).
207
See id. at 999.
208
See id. at 1001–03.
209
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012).
210
Downing, 265 F.3d at 999. The Lanham Act § 43(a) claim analysis is found at 265 F.3d at
1007–09.
211
See id. at 1009.
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court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the § 43(a) claim on
summary judgment.212
The Downing court’s concern with endorsement can also be discerned,
at least implicitly, in its rejection of Abercrombie & Fitch’s First
Amendment defense to the right-of-publicity claim. Although the
photograph of the plaintiff surfers was used in combination with a
journalistic-style story about surfing,213 the court rejected, not very
plausibly, the idea that the photos had editorial value,214 saying the photos
“d[id] not contribute significantly to a matter of the public interest.”215
Strangely, the court’s ad hoc constitutional analysis did not draw at all on
the U.S. Supreme Court’s teachings on First Amendment protection for
commercial speech in reaching its result. The court’s short shrift with the
First Amendment suggests that the analysis was not, in substance, about
rejecting constitutional concerns, but about separating this case, as an
endorsement-right case, from cases where an endorsement was not part of
the allegations.
The existence of the endorsement right finds support, as well, in the
American Law Institute’s Restatement of Unfair Competition.216 It should
be noted that, like other blackletter pronouncements about the right of
publicity, the Restatement’s description is overbroad. Yet the Restatement
does specify that embraced within its conception of the right of publicity
are situations in which a person’s identity is “used in advertising the user’s
goods or services.”217

212

Id. at 1010.
Id. at 1000 (“The Spring 1999 Quarterly, ‘Spring Fever,’ contains a section entitled ‘Surf
Nekkid.’ The ‘Surf Nekkid’ section includes an article recounting the history of surfing. Abercrombie
also included a 700-word story, entitled ‘Your Beach Should Be This Cool,’ describing the history of
Old Man’s Beach at San Onofre, California. The following page exhibits the photograph of Appellants.
The two pages immediately thereafter feature [clothing for sale].”).
214
Id. at 1002–03. (“In the current action, there is a tenuous relationship between Appellants’
photograph and the theme presented. Abercrombie used Appellants’ photograph essentially as windowdressing to advance the catalog’s surf-theme. The catalog did not explain that Appellants were legends
of the sport and did not in any way connect Appellants with the story preceding it. In fact, the catalog
incorrectly identifies where and when the photograph was taken. We conclude that the illustrative use
of Appellants’ photograph does not contribute significantly to a matter of the public interest and that
Abercrombie cannot avail itself of the First Amendment defense. Accordingly, we reverse the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Abercrombie.”).
215
Id. at 1002.
216
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46–47 (1995).
217
See id. § 46 (“One who appropriates the commercial value of a person’s identity by using
without consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject
to liability . . . .”); id. § 47 (“The name, likeness, and other indicia of a person’s identity are used ‘for
purposes of trade’ under the rule stated in § 46 if they are used in advertising the user’s goods or
services . . . .”).
213
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The Restatement’s use of the word “advertising” brings up an
important clarifying point. Despite speaking of “use[] in advertising” rather
than “endorsement,” the Restatement nonetheless seems to be getting at the
endorsement concept. But the terms “advertising” and “endorsement” are
not equivalent. The word “advertising” does not get at the essence of the
matter. There are uses in advertising that would not imply an endorsement,
and which, correspondingly, are not right-of-publicity violations. For
instance, there is no implied endorsement in using a person’s identity in
advertising for a motion picture where that person is a subject of the motion
picture. The same would be true of advertising for a television news
program or an unauthorized biographical book about a person. Indeed, the
Restatement recognizes this, but it does so in a doctrinally inverted way,
saying that the scope of the right of publicity “does not ordinarily include
the use of a person’s identity in news reporting, commentary,
entertainment, works of fiction or nonfiction, or in advertising that is
incidental to such uses.”218
B.

The Merchandizing Entitlement

Along with endorsement cases, right-of-publicity actions are also
routinely successful where a person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of
identity is used in merchandizing219—placing a recognizable symbol (name,
likeness, etc.) on a product to propel the sale of that product.220
With merchandizing, the consumer is generally buying the product—
coffee mug, t-shirt, key chain, lunch box, etc.—because of the symbol and
its message-carrying capacity; frequently the merchandise is a means of
displaying cultural affinity.221 The product’s functional utility is secondary.
Such goods are often called “merch.”
The merchandizing entitlement can be summed up in a simple
statement as follows:
Persons have the exclusive privilege to exploit their name and likeness in
merchandizing.
218

Id. § 47.
The terms “merchandise” and “merchandizing” are used variably in business. I use these terms
in a particular senses, as I explain.
220
Cf. Jennifer A. Konefal, Note, Dastar: Federal Trademark Law in an Uncertain State, 11 B.U.
J. SCI. & TECH. L. 283, 298 n.130 (2005) (“[M]erchandising can be defined for purposes of this paper as
‘licensing publicly recognizable properties for use on or in association with specific products or
services to foster their sale.’”) (citation omitted).
221
See Madow, supra note 2, at 128–29 (noting that “celebrities haul . . . semiotic freight” and that
“there is a large and increasingly lucrative market for merchandise (T-shirts, posters, greeting cards,
buttons, party favors, coffee mugs, school notebooks, dolls, and so on) bearing the names, faces, or
other identifying characteristics of celebrities, living and dead”).
219
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In terms of the interests it protects, the merchandizing entitlement has
a strong kinship with copyright and design patent. It is, in other words,
much more intellectual-property-like than the endorsement right, which is
more tort-like in nature.
The case that is generally considered the first right-of-publicity case,
Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., is best understood
as a merchandizing-entitlement case.222 The merchandise there was baseball
cards. Moreover, the case is known for recognizing a property-type aspect
in the right of publicity, a point which distinguished Haelan from the more
tort-oriented cases that came before it.223 Many merchandizing-entitlementtype right-of-publicity cases have followed. They include: Bi-Rite
Enterprises, Inc. v. Button Master, a successful suit by Pat Benatar and
other musical artists to stop the unlicensed distribution of buttons bearing
their names and photos;224 Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., a successful
suit by a holding company of the Elvis Presley estate against the distributor
of “memorial” posters after the singer’s death;225 Comedy III Productions,
Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., a successful suit by the Three Stooges holding
company against an artist who sold lithographs and t-shirts bearing his
sketch of Larry, Curly, and Moe;226 and Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for
Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Products, Inc., a successful suit
by the slain civil rights leader’s rights-holding organization against the
seller of memorial busts.227 These cases are all regarded by the courts as
standard right-of-publicity cases.
The centrality of the merchandizing aspect in these cases can be
perceived when we compare successful merchandizing cases to certain
cases where the courts rejected a right-of-publicity claim. For instance, the
merchandizing essence of Haelan is made more clear by comparing it to
another baseball card case that came along decades later, Cardtoons, L.C.
v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n.228 In the 1996 Cardtoons case, the
Tenth Circuit rejected a right-of-publicity claim, and the case can be read
as doing so precisely because these particular cards—parody cards that

222

202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
Whether the right-of-publicity cause of action is better understood as sounding in tort or being a
species of intellectual property is a long-running question in right-of-publicity cases and commentary.
For a discussion, see supra Part I, particularly supra notes 14, 34 and accompanying text.
224
555 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
225
579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978).
226
21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
227
296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982).
228
95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996).
223
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lampooned famous ballplayers—were not player merchandise.229 The court
did not say this expressly, but it bound up the merchandizing question with
its First Amendment analysis, brushing off the players’ characterization of
the cards as merchandise and simultaneously upholding the paramount
importance of the defendant’s free speech interests.
The disposition of the Cardtoons case would have been simplified—
and would have avoided the need to bring the First Amendment to bear—if
it had simply asked whether the parody baseball cards were player
merchandise, a question that would have been easily answered no.
Surveying the merchandizing cases shows that where the use of the
plaintiffs’ name or likeness is what would be considered a merchandizing
use, then First Amendment and copyright preemption defenses fail.230 On
the other hand, where First Amendment or copyright preemption defenses
succeed with likeness-bearing products, it seems to coincide with a
determination that the product somehow rose above the level of mere
merchandise to constitute art.231
C.

The Right Against Virtual Impressment

Beyond the endorsement right and the merchandizing entitlement,
there is a third constellation of right-of-publicity cases—arising in at least
some courts, albeit infrequently. I will call this cluster “virtual
impressment.”232 In proceeding to speak of a “right against virtual
impressment,” I do not mean to make a declaration of its existence and

229

Id. at 971 (“Cardtoons’ expression requires use of player identities because, in addition to
parodying the institution of baseball, the cards also lampoon individual players. Further, Cardtoons’ use
of the trading card format is an essential component of the parody because baseball cards have
traditionally been used to celebrate baseball players and their accomplishments.”).
230
See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc., 21 P.3d at 811 (rejecting a First Amendment defense because
use of the Three Stooges likenesses was not sufficiently “transformative”). See generally supra Sections
II.D.1–2 (discussing the First Amendment and copyright preemption).
231
See, e.g., ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 919, 936 (6th Cir. 2003) (upholding a
First Amendment defense for depictions of Tiger Woods in what the court characterized not as posters,
but as serigraphs and lithographs, which were priced at $700 and $100, respectively).
232
Other names could include “unwitting employment,” “unwitting performance,” “virtual
conscription,” “virtual servitude,” or the like. Yet another name might be “unfair exploitation,” which
hints at the underlying unjust enrichment essence of the claim. But that label seems too embracing of
unrelated situations. Another term, used by some scholars, is "virtual kidnapping." See, e.g., Peter
Johnson, Can You Quote Donald Duck?: Intellectual Property in Cyberculture, 13 YALE J.L. &
HUMANITIES 451, 480 (2001). That term, however, has also been used to denote a criminal ransom
demand based on a kidnapping that has not actually occurred. See, e.g., Samantha Kenney, Regional
Shortcomings and Global Solutions: Kidnap, Ransom and Insurance in Latin America, 14 CONN. INS.
L.J. 557, 569 (2008).
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validity.233 Rather, my aim is to make sense of a cluster of cases that have
evident coherence, even if they are comparatively rare birds. To be precise,
my claim is that there is a line of cases from some jurisdictions that can be
explained as producing outcomes as if such a right exists.
At the broadest level of generality, this virtual-impressment species of
right-of-publicity violation involves some kind of simulated or constructive
enlistment of the plaintiff to provide a performance that, at least in the
absence of enabling technology or a skilled impersonator, would require
hiring the plaintiff. Here is a concise statement:
Persons may recover from another who exploits their name, likeness, or voice
in such a way that they have been unwittingly employed to produce a
performance that might otherwise require voluntarily supplied labor.

In terms of the interests it vindicates, the action for virtual
impressment has kinship with unjust enrichment. It is notably not
copyright- or patent-like, as the merchandizing entitlement is. And it is not
tort-like, as the endorsement right is. Rather, the action for virtual
impressment can be seen as the law imposing itself to reverse what is
understood to be a windfall.
The action for virtual impressment is notably distinct from
merchandizing-entitlement and endorsement-right cases in the occupation
of the defendant. With merchandizing or endorsement cases, the plaintiff
and defendant are generally in different industries. The plaintiff might be a
famous actor while the defendant is a seller of coffee mugs. The battle is
one of an entertainment-sector plaintiff versus a hard-goods manufacturer.
In actions for virtual impressment, however, it is common to see a plaintiff
and defendant both from the entertainment sector.
The most straightforward instance of this kind of right-of-publicity
claim would be where a film celebrity is digitally modeled and inserted into
a film, so that the actor’s performance is included within the film even
though the actor was not on set and rendered no real-world performance.
This has been called “digitalcasting”234 and “digital reanimation.”235 While
generally unexplored by the courts, the subject of digitally created

233

Given the sparsity of virtual-impressment-type cases that have accumulated at this point,
making such a declaration is a task that should be left to a court or legislature.
234
See, e.g., Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE
L.J. 383, 389 n.21 (1999) (discussing “digitalcasting”).
235
See e.g., Thomas Glenn Martin Jr., Comment, Rebirth and Rejuvenation in a Digital
Hollywood: The Challenge Computer-Simulated Celebrities Present for California’s Antiquated Right
of Publicity, 4 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 99, 127 (1996) (referring to “digital reanimation” as “digitally
recreat[ing] live actors with no appreciable difference in likeness, voice, or acting quality [and] digitally
resurrect[ing] deceased celebrities”).
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performances has received considerable attention in the literature, with
commentators finding right-of-publicity law relevant, if less than clear, as
to the extent to which such depictions might be actionable.236
A virtual-impressment fact scenario that has been explored in the
courts is the depiction of real persons in videogames. Claims in this factual
context have generally been successful in a series of cases concerning
college athletes’ depictions in video games that simulate the team identities
and rosters for a given sport in a given year. In Hart v. Electronic Arts,
Inc., Ryan Hart, former quarterback for Rutgers University, sued Electronic
Arts (EA), the maker of the NCAA Football videogame series.237 The
district court held that First Amendment interests outweighed Hart’s rightof-publicity claim, but the Third Circuit reversed, holding that EA’s use of
player identities for game avatars was not transformative enough for First
Amendment protection.238
In a separate NCAA/EA sports videogame case, In re NCAA StudentAthlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation239 —decided a few weeks
after Hart—the Ninth Circuit rejected a First Amendment defense,
similarly citing a lack of transformativeness.240 Subsequently, EA settled
class-action claims in the suit with a payment to athletes of up to $40
million ($4,000 each for 100,000 athletes) for their videogame
depictions.241
In a third videogame case, No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc.,242
members of the band No Doubt were successful with a right-of-publicity
claim against videogame publisher Activision for their unauthorized
depiction in the videogame Band Hero, which allowed players to cause the

236

See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 4, at 184 (2005) (acknowledging the relevance of right-ofpublicity doctrine to digitally simulated performance); Joseph J. Beard, Clones, Bones and Twilight
Zones: Protecting the Digital Persona of the Quick, the Dead and the Imaginary, 16 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1165, 1174, 1187 (2001) (characterizing a digitally created virtual performance of a real entertainer
as a right-of-publicity issue); Shannon Flynn Smith, If It Looks Like Tupac, Walks Like Tupac, and
Raps Like Tupac, It’s Probably Tupac: Virtual Cloning and Postmortem Right-of-Publicity
Implications, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1719, 1761 (arguing that law is needed to protect against postmortem digitally created virtual performance).
237
717 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2013).
238
Id. at 147, 167–68.
239
724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013).
240
Id. at 1284.
241
See Tom Farrey, Players, Game Makers Settle for $40M, ESPN (May 31, 2014),
http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/11010455/college-athletes-reach-40-million-settlement-ea-sportsncaa-licensing-arm [https://perma.cc/R2Q7-NA7C]. The settlement was part of the O’Bannon v. NCAA
antitrust litigation. Id.
242
122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
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No Doubt avatars to perform not only No Doubt songs, but songs by other
bands as well.243
An even lower-tech kind of virtual impressment situation involves
people functioning as impersonators. An early case in this vein is Estate of
Presley v. Russen from 1981.244 In that case, a New Jersey federal district
court issued a preliminary injunction against Rob Russen, producer of The
Big El Show,245 “a live theatrical presentation or concert designed to imitate
a performance of the late Elvis Presley[, which] stars an individual who
closely resembles Presley and who imitates the appearance, dress, and
characteristic performing style of Elvis Presley.”246
The court was aware the case was distinct from the endorsement and
merchandizing cases that characterize most of the right-of-publicity
landscape.247 Yet the court was persuaded a right-of-publicity claim should
lie in the simulated live performance context.
Invoking an unjust enrichment type of rationale, the court
characterized the question in the case as: “[W]hether the use of the likeness
of a famous deceased entertainer in a performance mainly designed to
imitate that famous entertainer’s own past stage performances is to be
considered primarily as a commercial appropriation . . . of the famous
entertainer’s likeness or as a valuable contribution of information or
culture.”248
The court answered that question by concluding that “the show serves
primarily to commercially exploit the likeness of Elvis Presley without
contributing anything of substantial value to society.”249
Some courts have followed Russen in finding liability in connection
with musical impersonator concerts, including impersonations of the
Beatles.250 But one cannot say right-of-publicity liability for live243

Id. at 402, 411 (denying an anti-SLAPP motion to strike on right of publicity claim and
specifically rejecting Activision’s asserted First Amendment defense).
244
513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981).
245
Id. at 1348.
246
Id. at 1359 (footnote omitted).
247
Id. at 1358 (acknowledging that “most of those cases finding that the right of publicity, or its
equivalence, prevails have involved the use of a famous name or likeness predominantly in connection
with the sale of consumer merchandise or solely for purposes of trade—e.g., merely to attract
attention”) (footnote, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted).
248
Id. at 1359.
249
Id. (footnote omitted).
250
See, e.g., Apple Corps Ltd. v. A.D.P.R., Inc., 843 F. Supp. 342, 344, 349–50 (M.D. Tenn. 1993)
(right-of-publicity claim for advertising and marketing of performances, if not the performances
themselves, of Beatles impersonator group “1964 at the Beatles”); Apple Corps Ltd. v. Leber, No. C
299149, 1986 WL 215081, at *3 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 3, 1986) (liability under New York law for
Beatles impersonators’ Beatlemania show).
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performance has attained anything approaching a majority view. Notably,
Nevada’s right-of-publicity statute expressly exempts “an attempt to
portray, imitate, simulate or impersonate a person in a live performance”
from liability.251 Nevada’s exemption clearly has special relevance for Las
Vegas stage productions, where one can see impersonators performing as
Frank Sinatra, Sammy Davis, Jr., Madonna, and Elton John.252 Even the
Beatles have been recreated at the Planet Hollywood Hotel & Casino.253
IV.

SOME IMPLICATIONS

In this Part, I want to suggest some implications of the three-rights
view of the right of publicity. As I have stressed, my aim in this Article is
not to argue either in favor or against any of the three rights I have
delineated.254 My aim, instead, is to provide a way of talking about right-ofpublicity law with greater clarity. Thus, I think the most salient
consequence of understanding the right of publicity as three specifically
delimited rights, rather than as one amorphous one, is to see that courts can
reach desired results without engaging in tortured machinations of the law
or facts.255
As to other implications, in this Part, I explore how the three-rights
view can lay the groundwork for a more fine-grained debate over theory,
and I suggest that the tripartite formulation may be of use to courts and
legislatures asked to make new recognitions of a cause of action in the
publicity-rights arena.
A.

Theoretical Distinctions

Many theories have been offered to justify the right of publicity.
Notably, these theories appear to map differently onto each of the three
rights described in this Article. I will not attempt to comprehensively
theorize each of the three rights, but I will provide a couple of examples of
how theory seems to apply to the rights differentially.

251

NEV. REV. STAT. § 597.790(2)(b) (2016).
See Georgi Schultz, Guide to Las Vegas Impersonator Shows, SHOWTICKETS.COM (Feb. 19,
2015),
http://lasvegas.showtickets.com/articles/top-las-vegas-impersonator-shows-guide/
[https://
perma.cc/4NHV-C63S]; see also Laura Hock, What’s in a Name? Fred Goldman’s Quest to Acquire
O.J. Simpson’s Right of Publicity and the Suit’s Implications for Celebrities, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 347, 360
n.60 (2008) (opining that “exclusion is no doubt due to the large number of shows occurring each year
in Las Vegas”).
253
Schultz, supra note 252.
254
See the beginning of supra Part III.
255
As two examples, see supra notes 138–63 and accompanying text (regarding Laws) and supra
notes 176–95 and accompanying text (regarding Polydoros).
252
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For instance, one justification offered for the right of publicity is what
can be called the market-information/consumer-protection theory—that the
right of publicity helps markets function by giving consumers useful
information about products.256 As one court invoked the concept,
“[a]ssociating one’s goodwill with a product transmits valuable information
to consumers.”257 This market-information story of the right of publicity is
essentially the same economic narrative that undergirds trademark: A
functioning, efficient market is abetted by dependable information about
the sources of products.258 A consumer who sees a celebrity endorse a
certain product may, according to theory, assume that the celebrity “would
not associate himself, even for a fee, with a firm that provides inferior
service.”259
The market-information theory has been subjected to strong criticism
in the right-of-publicity context.260 To the extent one accepts the theory on
its own terms, however, it seems clear that it supplies support differentially
to the endorsement right, the merchandizing entitlement, and the right
against virtual impressment.
The theory’s support for the endorsement-right prong of the right of
publicity seems relatively strong: To the extent that personal identities can
transmit information about products—at least outside of the existing
trademark context that is already covered by trademark law—the
recognition of an endorsement right seems a straightforward way to
achieve this.261

256

Douglas Baird, Note, Human Cannonballs and the First Amendment: Zacchini v. ScrippsHoward Broadcasting Co., 30 STAN. L. REV. 1185, 1187 n.7 (1978) (arguing that legally protected
celebrity identities, when used in conjunction with products, “promote the flow of useful information
about commercial goods and services to the public by ensuring that the public is not confused by a false
implication that a particular celebrity has endorsed a particular good”).
257
Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1994).
258
See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1277
(explaining that Congress enacted trademark law to “protect the public so that it may be confident that,
in purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the product
which it asks for and which it wants to get” and to protect investments in commercial reputation).
259
James M. Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and Personal Histories,
51 TEX. L. REV. 637, 645 (1973).
260
For example, Michael Madow posits that instead of reasoning logically about what celebrity
endorsement indicates about a product, celebrity endorsement may derive its impact by working at the
level of a consumer’s emotion. See Madow, supra note 2, at 231. Further, Madow points out that if the
right of publicity is justified by a trademark/consumer-deception theory, then it seems anomalous that
the right of publicity can be used to enjoin truthful representations about the association of a given
celebrity and a given product. Id.
261
See Treece, supra note 259, at 644–45 (“Names and pictures of celebrities more effectively
produce customer responses than those of noncelebrities, but images of unknown people also motivate
decisions to purchase.”).
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For the merchandising entitlement, however, the rationale of
providing needed market information and consumer protection appears
relatively weak, or even nonsensical: In the merchandizing context, a
celebrity’s image on a product is not an indication of value; rather, the
image is the source of value for that product.262
And for a right against virtual impressment, the marketinformation/consumer-protection theory appears non-applicable. When
Elvis fans go to see an Elvis impersonator show, those fans are basing their
decision entirely on the sort of entertainment they want to consume, not on
a misapprehension that they are actually going to see Elvis. In such a case,
the name “Elvis” does not provide information about the level of quality of
the show; it provides nominative information about the subject matter of
the live performance.
Personal autonomy or autonomous self-definition is another
theoretical justification that has been offered for the right of publicity, and
it too seems to apply to the three rights quite differently. The autonomycentered idea is that the right of publicity provides a legal mechanism for
people to control the image they project of themselves to the world by
allowing them to choose what, if any, associations they will have with
commercial ventures. This theory has been notably championed by Mark
McKenna, who explains that “[t]he things and people with which
individuals choose to associate reflect their character and values. An
individual’s choices therefore can be viewed as the text of her identity, and
unauthorized uses of a person’s identity in connection with products or
services threaten to recreate that text.”263
Insofar as autonomous self-definition is a compelling justification for
law, it applies most strongly when it comes to unauthorized endorsements.
In general, McKenna’s examples of factual situations that implicate
autonomous self-definition interests are examples of unauthorized
endorsements, such as a football player unwittingly made to appear in an
advertisement for beer.264 Uses that suggest a person’s endorsement of

262

The merchandizing entitlement, by its very nature, concerns objects whose value to the
consumer derives principally from the fact that the objects carry the symbol, as opposed to deriving
from the objects’ functional nature. See supra Section III.B.
263
McKenna, supra note 2, at 229.
264
Id. at 280–82 (additionally citing as examples a person’s picture used in a television ad for an
erectile-dysfunction medication, a country singer’s appearance in a home-appliance commercial, and a
radio disc jockey’s employment as a spokesperson for a fast-food restaurant).
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goods or services can be said to impinge on a person’s right of autonomous
self-definition because they force someone to speak on another’s behalf.265
As a justification for the merchandizing entitlement, by contrast,
autonomous self-definition is clearly not as strong. It is at least plausible
that persons could argue that their sense of self is undermined when their
image is appropriated to merchandise. On the other hand, merchandizing
might be characterized as a merely “referential” use of a person’s identity,
not a use that threatens to alter meaning and therefore impinge on a
person’s right of self-definition.266 One can go even further and plausibly
argue that personal autonomy tends to justify the rejection of a
merchandizing-entitlement cause of action. When people wear or use
merchandise bearing a celebrity name or likeness, they do so typically as a
way of showing cultural identification with what that celebrity has come to
represent.267 Thus, the free availability of celebrity merchandise, unfettered
by exclusive legal claims, could be seen as abetting the autonomous selfdefinition interests of merchandise purchasers.
By contrast, a theory of personal autonomy or autonomous selfdefinition seems plausibly strong in the virtual-impressment context,
because to employ an entertainer in a capacity not reflecting that
entertainer’s vision of self could be said to infringe upon that entertainer’s
right to self-define. Suppose Jane Smith is a singer/songwriter who has
made a decision, based on newfound religious convictions, to no longer
perform the hit song that once made her famous, one which she now
regards as blasphemous. An impersonator giving a live performance of that
song might be regarded as interfering with Jane’s decision to disavow her
own song.268
These example, above, are meant to be just a sampling of how the
three-rights view of the right of publicity might help advance and sharpen
265

Id. at 286 (stating, for example, that “an individual should be able to prevent uses that suggest
her sponsorship or endorsement” on the basis that implied endorsement is essentially forcing someone
to speak on behalf of another and carry their message).
266
See id. at 291 (discussing the limitations of an autonomy-based right-of-publicity action, and
noting that “[s]ince celebrity personas are packed with a rich set of connotations that are understood
widely, they play a crucial role in the genesis and transmission of culture. Some uses then may simply
draw on the cultural meaning of their time in order to communicate, without risk of redefining that
meaning” (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted)).
267
See, e.g., Madow, supra note 2, at 143 (discussing various examples, including the use of the
image of Judy Garland in the 1950s as “a powerful means” for gay men “of speaking to each other
about themselves”).
268
See Gregory Klass, The Very Idea of a First Amendment Right Against Compelled
Subsidization, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1087, 1116 (2005) (“Compelling a person to express a message
herself presents a particular sort of threat to her freedom of belief. It threatens her ability to control what
she tells the world about who she is and what she holds important. . . .”).
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the debate about theoretical justifications for the right of publicity.
Moreover, the above examples help to highlight, as a descriptive doctrinal
matter, the very real conceptual distinctions among the endorsement right,
the merchandizing entitlement, and the right against virtual impressment.
B.

Precision in Judicial or Legislative Adoption

The right of publicity has, over the decades, grown in recognition
among jurisdictions, and courts and legislatures will continue to face
choices of whether to create additional legal recognition for the right of
publicity. In making these decisions, the doctrinal architecture I have
suggested in this Article may help lawmakers and judges in understanding
the choices available to them. That is, the three-rights view of the right of
publicity can provide courts and legislatures with a menu to use when
making new law.
Specifically, viewing the right of publicity as three separate rights,
each one associated with a distinct cause of action, invites jurisdictions to
adopt one or two of the causes of action without adopting them all. This
capacity should facilitate more purposeful development of the law across
jurisdictions.
Prosser’s ramification of the right of privacy into four separate rights
and associated causes of action provided a similar opportunity to courts.269
For instance, Florida courts have declined to recognize the existence of the
false light tort.270 Yet Florida courts have recognized a cause of action for
public disclosure of private facts.271 With a subdivided right of publicity,
jurisdictions can take advantage of additional opportunities for choosiness.
CONCLUSION
Since its birth a little over sixty years ago, the right of publicity has
lacked a solid articulation. To be sure, courts have recited a pat blackletter
statement of the right, but the reality has always been at odds with this
formulation. This broken aspect of the law, inconvenient as it is, has long
been ignored by the bench, the bar, and the academy. But as this Article has
shown, it is productive to think carefully about the difference between what
is said and what is done in the right-of-publicity context, because the
disconnect seems to lie at the root of the right of publicity’s most urgent
problems.
269

Regarding Prosser’s four-way division of the right of privacy, see supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
270
See Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1100 (Fla. 2008) (declining to recognize false
light as a cause of action on the grounds that it offers little over defamation).
271
See Doe v. Univision Television Grp., Inc., 717 So. 2d 63, 64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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Lacking a means of talking about what the right of publicity is, courts
have concentrated on what the right of publicity is not. Norms of
constitutional avoidance have fallen by the wayside as courts have used the
First Amendment to burn away the right of publicity’s sprawling excesses
in case after case. When the First Amendment would not work, courts have
engaged in improbable and even incoherent copyright-preemption analysis,
or else have ignored facts, logic, and precedent in ways that can be
described as judge nullification.
This Article has sought to supply the missing blackletter explanation
for what the right of publicity is. The trick to making sense of the right of
publicity is to understand that rather than being one right and one cause of
action, it is in reality three separate rights cognizable with three distinct
actions. This Article has delineated those rights as the endorsement right,
the merchandizing entitlement, and the right against virtual impressment.
As things stand today, the right of publicity needs help. Practitioners
perceive rampant unpredictability in the resolution of publicity-rights
disputes.272 Judicial opinions reveal the courts’ enduring befuddlement in
applying the law.273 And scholars see deep theoretical unsoundness.274 My
hope is that the analysis offered in the Article will be productively
disruptive on all fronts, thus enabling real progress with what has been one
of the most persistently vexing areas of modern intellectual property law.

272
273
274

See supra note 4.
See discussion in supra Section II.D.
See supra note 2.
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